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PERSONAL EXPLANATION—WAR CABINET

SPEECH

OF

HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF OREGON

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 24, 1918



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1918

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SPEECH
OF
HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN.

The bill (S. 3583) to establish a war cabinet and to define the jurisdiction and authority thereof was on its second reading.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I rise to a question of personal privilege.

Mr. President, for 24 years of my life I have served the people of my State in one capacity or another to the best of an ability with which Providence saw fit to endow me, and in all that time I have never had my veracity called in question nor my integrity impeached, and I am frank to say that I have passed through some campaigns as bitter as have fallen to the lot of any man. It is therefore with some feeling of humiliation, and I may say of sadness, that I rise before this distinguished body to a question of personal privilege when my veracity has for the first time been called in question—not by an ordinary citizen in the ordinary walks of life—not by one of my colleagues, who stands upon the same level as myself socially and politically, but by a very distinguished gentleman who has the love and admiration of the people of this country, and who through their suffrage now occupies the highest place in the gift of our people, and I may say the highest place of any man on the face of the earth.

It is, therefore, with a peculiar feeling that I rise to address myself to the attack which has been made upon me, Mr. President, and I do it not with any feeling of unkindness, because the personal differences between the distinguished President and myself amount to nothing to the American people, but there are great policies at issue between us and between other people of this country, a proper settlement of which may, Mr. President, involve the very life of the Republic, and possibly the civilization of the world.

Some days ago a distinguished body of citizens invited me to deliver an address before the National Security League in New York. I accepted that invitation. On the dais with me were some of the best known men and women in America. The presiding officer of that meeting was a gentleman whom our distinguished President has seen fit to honor, and who has been highly honored by other Executives in the days gone by. I refer to Hon. Elihu Root.

On my right sat Judge Alton B. Parker, who was once a candidate of our party for the Presidency. On the left of the presiding officer was a very distinguished Republican friend of mine and a friend of his country, though born in a country that is now at war with America, Hon. JULIUS KAHN, of California. To his left was a distinguished ex-President of the United States

in the person of Col. Roosevelt. The widow of ex-President Cleveland was there, and, Mr. President, I say without fear of contradiction that the 2,000 people there represented every walk of life and a spirit of patriotism that can not be excelled in a like number of people anywhere in the United States.

In the multitude of work that has fallen to my lot it was impossible for me to prepare an address, and I did not even have time to correct the proof or revise it after it was delivered. It was reported in the New York Times in what appeared to be a verbatim report, and I assume the responsibility of the speech as printed in that paper. If there are any inaccuracies of diction or grammar I trust that under the circumstances the Senate will overlook them. Inasmuch as it forms the text of the charge against me of having distorted the truth I am going to ask that the Secretary may be permitted to read it. It is not very long. I dislike to burden the Senate with it, but I want the Senate to have the context of what I said in connection with what the distinguished President of the United States complains of in his public statement.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none and the Secretary will read.

The Secretary read as follows:

"I assure you it is a very great pleasure and privilege to be permitted to be with you to-day, because I feel that we are all engaged in the same great work—the work of the preservation not only of our country, but the preservation and perpetuation of civilization itself. Let me disclaim, my friends, any credit for what has been accomplished and for what we hope to accomplish in the great task that confronts us in this emergency. Let me say to you that I have had the cooperation and effort of the great mass of the Members of Congress without regard to party; and in addition to that, and above and over everything else, we have had the support of such distinguished men as the ex-President and ex-Commander in Chief of the Armies and Navies of the United States, and such men as my friend, Mr. Elihu Root, all of whom are here with us to-day.

"In season and out of season these distinguished gentlemen have gone out among the people and have tried to impress upon them, and they have begun to realize, that America, for the first time in its history, is involved in a war which may, my friends, mean its life and its dissolution unless America and her allies happen to be successful in it.

"Because of the limitation upon my time, and I know you are all glad of it [cries of 'No! No!'] it is absolutely impossible to go into this subject as I would love to go into it with you, and to discuss the military policy of the United States, or its lack of a military policy, since the earliest Revolutionary time. It has not been the fact that we have had a faulty military policy during all of those years; it has been, my friends, that we have had no military policy that has led us into these troublous times and conditions. We are wont to talk of the magnificent courage of our forefathers, but it has often seemed to me that the most unfortunate thing that ever happened in this country was the fact that an unorganized militia at Bunker Hill was able to defeat an organized army of Great Britain, because there was

then established what was later to be called the traditional policy of the United States against the organization of a standing army, or, rather, of a trained army to be called into service whenever the emergency required.

"BANE OF 'TRADITIONAL POLICY.'

"From that day to this the histories of our country have talked about the traditional policies of the United States, and have commended the valor of the Revolutionary troops. I have no disposition to criticize that statement or to question the valor—the individual valor—of the splendid men who fought the battles of the Revolutionary days, but the lack of organization which was decried by the commanding officers then and which has been decried by them since, and has been criticized, are the troubles which confront us to-day; and if their recommendations had been followed we not only would have had a splendid Army now, but that Army would have been organized and raised under a system of universal military training that would have made us absolutely unconquerable.

"Washington called attention to it, and I have sometimes wondered how that distinguished commander of the American forces, with his splendid aid, Alexander Hamilton, ever had time to organize an Army because they devoted much of their time to appeals to a Continental Congress and to the States to assist them in organizing an Army that might be successful in accomplishment of victory. I wish I could go into these matters and discuss the various battles that were fought; but, incidentally, let me tell you that America did not owe the accomplishment of victory in 1783 to her untrained Army, but she owed it to France and the splendid efforts that France made.

"With all the pacifists that are abroad in the land denouncing America for sending a few hundred thousand men or a million men to France in this day of rapid transit, it is well to remember that when America, on account of Washington's efforts, appealed to France for assistance, she sent to us under Rochambeau five or six thousand troops across the water, and instead of taking them five or ten days or two weeks to reach America, they were seventy-seven days from the time they left a French port until they landed at Newport, R. I., afflicted with disease, and chased every foot of the way by a British fleet. My friends, if America had nothing else to fight for in this war than to preserve the magnificent French Republic, every drop of blood shed and every dollar of treasure spent would be well spent for this splendid people.

"I am going to skip through it all, because my time is almost up now. We have got to get out of here at 3 o'clock, mind you.

"Traditional policy? It seems to me that a war policy called for by Washington and advocated by him would sustain a policy now of training young men to do battle for their country. We have departed from traditional policy, thank God, and in the last two years we have enacted a law that, as your chairman has said, compels Americans to know that the benefits of citizenship carry with them the responsibility for service whenever that service happens to be needed.

"VICIOUS VOLUNTEER SYSTEM.

"The selective draft law which has been mentioned here, put into service every man between 21 and 30; and it may be said

to the credit of those young men who have been drafted that they are rendering just as effective and just as patriotic service as those who have volunteered. I sometimes regret that volunteering has ever been permitted, for the reason that in the loss that we sustain in the battles where there is a volunteer system, as there was in Great Britain, we have a horizontal loss, taking the young, red-blooded people that volunteer for service and leaving those who ought to have shared the fate of their colleagues at the first sound of war. On the other hand, under this system we take from the walks of industrial and commercial and everyday life young men of all classes, so that there is not this horizontal loss that I speak of, but rather a perpendicular loss, where the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the professional man and the artisan, stand shoulder to shoulder, and when losses come, the loss falls on all, every social stratum of life.

"Let me tell you that we are going to extend that. We are going to commence to train the young men from 18 to 21, so that when they become 21 we will have an army of young men to draw from every walk of life.

"But, say the pacifists, it is unnecessary in the United States to train the young men or to have an army. My friends, there were those in Great Britain who said it was unnecessary; and yet, but for the fact that republican France trained her young men, what would have become of France when the German forces went down and attacked her on her western front? Nothing saved her but the universal military training which that splendid Republic had in vogue. Ah, my friends, let us get away from our prejudices. When those who now advocate universal military training began to advocate it nobody was with them; now the country, thank God, is with them, and the country will see to it that Congress gets with them, too.

"Now, in conclusion, and I have only touched a few of the high spots, let me say that the Military Establishment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist.

"EVERY DEPARTMENT INEFFICIENT.

"It has almost stopped functioning, my friends. Why? Because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the Government of the United States. [Applause.] We are trying to work it out. I speak not as a Democrat, but as an American citizen.

"A VOICE. You are telling the truth, Senator.

"We are trying [Senator CHAMBERLAIN continued], and I have burned the midnight oil in an effort to do it—we are trying to centralize the power of supplying the Army in one man who can say 'No' and has the nerve to say 'No' when the time comes to say it. We have reported a bill, following the experience of Great Britain and France, creating a director of munitions for this purpose. We have gone one step further and we have provided a bill for the creation of a cabinet of war, whose duty it shall be to lay out what we never have had, and have not now—a program to carry on this war to a successful conclusion. My friends, this is not an Administration measure; it is an American measure, and comes from Republicans and Democrats alike.

"I want this splendid audience, I want the citizenry of New York, I want you, Mr. Chairman, and all of you, to get behind these proposed laws and see to it that they grace the statute books of America, so that America may play her part in the war. Let us, my friends, rally to the flag of our country without regard to party. Let us see to it that the Stars and Stripes are planted upon the plains of France and be there, as it is here, the emblem of freedom, liberty, and the rights of man.

"Your flag and my flag, and how it flies to-day,
In your land and my land, and half the world away,
Rose-red and blood-red, the stripes forever gleam,
Snow-white and soul-white, the good forefathers' dream,
Sky-blue and true-blue with stars that gleam aright
A glorious guidon of the day, a shelter through the night.

"And so, my friends, whether our flag be planted here or in France, or wherever it may be, let us see that it is the emblem of a better civilization and a better form of government. I thank you."

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, that address was delivered on the 19th of this month. I returned to Washington the next day, and in the evening of that day I received from the President of the United States a letter, which I send to the desk and ask the Secretary to read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, 20 January, 1918.

MY DEAR SIR: You are reported in the New York World of this morning as having said at a luncheon in New York yesterday:

"The Military Establishment of America has fallen down; there is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist; it has almost stopped functioning. Why? Because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the Government of the United States. I speak not as a Democrat, but as an American citizen."

I would be very much obliged if you would tell me whether you were correctly quoted. I do not like to comment upon the statements made before learning from you yourself whether you actually made them.

Very truly, yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senator.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I received that letter too late to attempt to answer it last Sunday evening, but the first thing the next morning, and as soon as my office force came down, I dictated a letter to the President, and I ask to have that letter read into the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

JANUARY 21, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received last evening your favor of the 20th instant, in which you advise me that I was quoted in the New York World of same date with your letter as follows:

"The Military Establishment of American has fallen down; there is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist; it has almost stopped functioning. Why? Because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the Government of the United States. I speak not as a Democrat, but as an American citizen."

You desire to know if I am correctly quoted, inasmuch as you do not like to comment upon the statements made before learning from me whether I actually made them.

In reply permit me to say that the words quoted are substantially those used by me. My address on the occasion referred to was extemporaneous and without notes, but the New York Times of yesterday

morning purports to give a verbatim report of all the addresses made, and I believe the report made is substantially correct. In that I am quoted as saying, in part:

"Now, in conclusion, and I have only touched a few of the high spots, let me say that the Military Establishment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped functioning, my friends. Why? Because of inefficiency in every department of the Government of the United States. We are trying to work it out. I speak not as a Democrat, but as an American citizen."

You will note that there is very little difference between the two reports, and, in view of the fuller report in the Times, I am inclined to believe it correctly quotes me.

But, Mr. President, may I beg that you will do me the honor to read the whole of what I said in order that the part quoted may have its proper setting? I only had 20 minutes allotted me, and in that brief time undertook to show that since the Battle of Bunker Hill we had never had a proper military organization or policy and that our troubles now are largely due to that fact. I was only discussing the military policy, or lack of such policy, from the earliest days of the Republic, and immediately following the language last quoted I said:

"We are trying, my friends, and I have burned the midnight oil in an effort to do it—we have tried to centralize the power of supplying the Army in one man who can say 'no,' and has the nerve to say 'no' when the time comes to say it. We have reported a bill, following the experience of Great Britain and France, creating a director of munitions for this purpose. We have gone one step further, and we have provided a bill for the creation of a cabinet of war, whose duty it shall be to lay out what we never have had—and have not now—a program to carry on this war to a successful conclusion. My friends, this is not an administration measure; it is an American measure and comes from Republicans and Democrats both."

All present understood the criticism, and you will note that ex-President Roosevelt in his speech shortly following mine made substantially the same criticism of conditions during the Spanish-American War, although, as he said, "It was waged by an administration of which I was a part and in which I afterwards became even more closely connected."

I have been connected with the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate ever since I have been a Member of the Senate, and have taken a very deep interest in military legislation, and I believe I know something about the deficiencies in the Military Establishment. Since Congress convened the committee have been diligently at work endeavoring to find out actual conditions and to find some remedy for recognized or proven deficiencies in our military system. The testimony of witnesses in and out of the establishment clearly establishes the fact, Mr. President, that there are inefficiencies in the system that ought to be remedied for a proper prosecution of the war, and, further, that there are and have been inefficient connections with the administration of a disjointed and uncoordinated establishment. So feeling and so believing, I have felt it my duty to speak out in the hope that defects in the military code may be cured and inefficient later weeded out. I will be glad to join with other members of the committee and go over the situation with you at any time, if you desire it, and review the testimony which, taken in connection with an inherited deficient system, led me to the conclusion expressed in my short extemporaneous address to which you call my attention.

I have the honor to remain, yours, very sincerely,

GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN.

President WOODROW WILSON,
The White House.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, to that letter I received no reply; I do not know that any reply was necessary; but on the afternoon of that day—last Monday—there was printed in the evening papers, and generally printed throughout the United States, a statement by our distinguished President, and I assume that that is the answer to the letter. The press was kind enough, small as I am compared with our distinguished President, to print with his statement a very brief statement which I made to them upon reading the President's statement. I ask that both be read, Mr. President.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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The Secretary read as follows:

DOCUMENTS IN CLASH ON POLICY.

[Washington Herald, Jan. 22.]

By WOODROW WILSON.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN'S statement as to the present inaction and ineffectiveness of the Government is an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth.

As a matter of fact, the War Department has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency.

There have been delays and disappointments and partial miscarriages of plans, all of which have been drawn into the foreground and exaggerated by the investigations which have been in progress since the Congress assembled—investigations which drew indispensable officials of the department constantly away from their work and officers from their commands and contributed a great deal to such delay and confusion as has inevitably arisen. But by comparison with what has been accomplished, these things, much as they are to be regretted, were insignificant, and no mistake has been made which has been repeated.

Nothing helpful or likely to speed or facilitate the war tasks of the Government has come out of such criticism and investigation—I have not been consulted about them and have learned of them only at second hand—but their proposal came after effective measures of reorganization had been thoughtfully and maturely perfected, and inasmuch as these measures have been the result of experience, they are much more likely than any others to be effective. If the Congress will but remove a few statutory obstacles of rigid departmental organization which stand in their way.

The legislative proposals I have heard of would involve long additional delays and turn our experience into mere lost motion.

My association and constant conference with the Secretary of War have taught me to regard him as one of the ablest public officials I have ever known. The country will soon learn whether he or his critics understand the business in hand.

To add, as Senator CHAMBERLAIN did, that there is inefficiency in every department and bureau of the Government is to show such ignorance of actual conditions as to make it impossible to attach any importance to his statement.

I am bound to infer that that statement sprang out of opposition to the administration's whole policy rather than out of any serious intention to reform its practice.

By GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN.

My argument was directed to the Military Establishment and not to the General Government. Those who heard me know that.

I had no prepared speech and did not speak from notes. I delivered an extemporaneous address to the people there, explaining that since Bunker Hill we had had practically no military organization or policy. I discussed the subject from that viewpoint for 20 minutes.

I said the Senate Military Committee had tried to correct the evils by the introduction of the two new bills. One, written by me, is the director-of-munitions bill. The other, written by a subcommittee, is the war-cabinet bill.

I still stand for both.

Mr. Baker's efforts to better his organization within the Military Establishment itself have been commendable. He has tried to do something. Some improvements have been made in the system in vogue.

But in his plan the inherent weakness, in the last analysis, is that there is no one between the President and the Army able to act. The new system of Mr. Baker comprises the clearance board of the War Industries Board and the various purchasing departments. There is the inherent weakness. They can not act.

The war cabinet and the director of munitions have distinct and positive power. One maps the progress for the future, the other furnishes supplies for the Army. They constitute a strong link in a chain, which is never stronger than its weakest link.

We substitute for voluntary bodies a strong organization.

I regret that the administration is against the plan. But I will proceed with the bills. I feel it my duty as a Senator. The people of the country are entitled to be let into the confidence of the Senate Military Committee and the committee considers that the bills are necessary in order that the war preparations may be coordinated.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, the statement of the President challenges me, of course, to the proof of my statement as printed in the New York Times, to which I adhere, and which I now repeat. Whether my colleagues or the country will take the evidence by its four corners and reach the same conclusion that I have reached is an entirely different proposition. They may not see it from the same angle that I see it. Two men may read the same article and draw different conclusions from it. Two men may hear one witness testify and draw different inferences from what he said. Those are the inherent differences in human nature. But occupying the position that I do, Mr. President, as chairman of this great committee, associated as I have been with Democrats and Republicans whose single aim and effort has been to develop conditions as they exist without fear or favor or the hope of reward, I felt as an American citizen, and I feel as a Member of this distinguished body, that it was my duty to say the thing that was in me. If I succeeded, Mr. President, in making a rift in the clouds and letting the sunlight into the dark places where the American people are entitled to go and see, I feel that my efforts and the efforts of my colleagues, for whom I entertain the highest regard and respect, have not been in vain in an endeavor to save our country in the pending crisis.

The evidence has not yet been printed. That has not been due to any fault on the part of the committee, but, because of its importance, the testimony of each witness has been sent to him in order that he might revise it, and that the country might get the evidence as it came from the lips of the witnesses. I hope it will be finished to-day, so that the Senate may have it. But now, Mr. President, in view of the fact that my truthfulness has been called in question, I feel it my duty, not to go into detail—because it would take me days to do that—but to say some things here in all kindness, and to tell the country some things that possibly I might not have told under ordinary circumstances until the investigation now in progress had been completed. I shall do it as a man who loves his country first of all, a man who would sacrifice not only his own life but the life of every member of his family to save it. I shall do it fearlessly, and as an American citizen who wants to help and not hinder the President in this emergency.

I rather think, Mr. President, that it is not that I have distorted the truth, for I have sometimes feared that in the multitude of cares and responsibilities that have devolved upon the President of the United States he has not been able to ascertain the truth. If he has relied upon some of those who have come before our committee, Mr. President and my fellow Senators, he does not know the truth, and from the lips of some of those who have testified and who are closest to him he can not find the truth; not because there has been a disposition to deceive or mislead our distinguished Executive possibly, but simply because they, too, are so situated, in the multitudinous affairs of this great crisis, that they can not ascertain the truth; and even if they could ascertain the truth through the labyrinth of things that pass over their desks and through their offices each day, it would be impossible for them to remember it for any purpose. So this investigation was started, Mr. President, with a

purpose to be critical where criticism was necessary and with the purpose to be constructive as well; and this committee would not have discharged its duty to the Senate and to the country if it had gone about the work with any other purpose in view than to criticize where criticism was just, and to offer suggestions of a constructive nature where that was proper.

Mr. President, the Secretary of War, in his general statement to the country—which was carefully written and prepared—tells us that \$3,200,000,000 have been appropriated for the Ordnance Department and contracts have been let for \$1,677,000,000; all of which is true. But the Secretary fails to tell us, Mr. President, in his statement to the country, and it only comes out in the course of a cross-examination, that America stands to-day unprepared so far as ordnance is concerned. I challenge anybody to read the testimony and come to any other conclusion. Poor, bleeding France, my friends—bled white, not only for her own life and for the liberty of her own citizens but for America as well—is to-day furnishing our troops as they arrive in France the necessary heavy ordnance and machine guns for aircraft and for ground service. Why, Mr. President, if we relied upon the Ordnance Department in this emergency to furnish our troops with the heavy ordnance—and this is largely a war of artillery to-day—the war would be over before we ever got to the front.

Why, there is testimony, if I correctly remember it, before the Military Affairs Committee that along some of these fronts the cannon—and heavy cannon, if you please—are located 5 yards apart for a distance of 6 miles; and yet America, this great and magnificent country, is dependent upon poor France to deliver the ordnance! Did France agree to deliver it in order to win over reluctant America? Did she agree to furnish it in order to encourage and hearten America? What would happen to France with the debacle in Italy, Senators, where her own troops are and where the troops of her allies are if she is to furnish ordnance to America? What is France to do for them in case of an emergency and a desperate battle for the life of one of her allies?

I will not go into details. I do not think it would be proper to go into details, but I call to the attention of the Senate the confidential evidence of Gen. Crozier himself as to the amount of contracts which the Secretary speaks of as having been let, and as to the progress of the work. If the administration wanted to be fair with the American people—and they are entitled to fair treatment, and to know these things—why did not the distinguished Secretary, whom I hold in the very highest regard as an able and intellectual gentleman, tell the American people how long it would take to make deliveries under these contracts and let them assist in getting ready for this terrible cataclysm that not only confronts America but confronts the world?

What has the Ordnance Department been doing since 1914? Was there even a half-witted American citizen who at the very outset did not know and realize that there was a chance that America might become involved? There were omens in the sky, my colleagues, that indicated that America would become involved, notwithstanding her desire to keep out. She could not

keep out. What was the Ordnance Department doing? Nothing. Here we were from August, 1914, until the declaration of war in April, 1917, with the Ordnance Department lying supinely upon its back, making no plans, constructing no gauges, manufacturing no dies, doing absolutely nothing to ascertain what were the possibilities in raw material and the possibilities of manufacture. It would not have taken any time, it would not have cost much, if anything, to have done that. Congress appropriated quite a large sum in two or three appropriation bills for the purpose of manufacturing dies, jigs, and gauges to be used in the construction of all of these implements of artillery warfare. That money has not been expended; and yet every business man and every sensible man in this country knows that for quantity production it is absolutely necessary to have the gauges and the jigs and the dies, so that when you are ready to manufacture all you have to do is to send them out, so that guns may be manufactured along those lines. What was the Ordnance Department doing? Nothing.

I am not blaming anybody in particular, Mr. President, but I am calling attention to facts and blaming an inefficient system. I have a very high regard for Gen. Crozier. He has made his reputation in the Army, and his life has been spent in the service of his country. We have not been able to do what Great Britain has done and what France has done and what Italy has done and what every one of our allies has been able to do, and that is to retire these gentlemen who have not proved themselves up to the mark when it comes to getting ready for war. We ought not to dismiss them in disgrace, but certainly they ought not to be continued in places where they have failed, or be promoted to higher rank. France has not hesitated to retire them to the shades of private life, or to the shades of inactive military life, if you please, into positions of innocuous desuetude. Great Britain has not hesitated to do it at any time. Why should America hesitate?

Senators, it is not a question of the individual or of individuals. This is not a question between the distinguished President of the United States and myself. It is a question of America; and every man in America ought to forget party, forget individuals, and forget everything, so that his whole thought and his whole life and his whole purpose may be devoted not only to the protection of the Republic but also to the perpetuation of our own institutions and the institutions of the civilized world, all of which are involved.

Oh, my colleagues and friends, I want you to read this testimony, and I want you to read it prayerfully and carefully and tearfully, if need be.

Take the question of machine guns. I am not going into the merits of any particular gun. That has been an old controversy here for years. There are things that can be said on both sides of it. Here was the Lewis gun, that was being manufactured in America for Great Britain. She had 70,000 of them on the battle front, and the testimony of every British soldier that I have seen is as to the excellent character of the gun. There are several kinds of machine guns. America was manufacturing in large numbers and on large contract the Lewis gun for export to the allies and was prepared to turn them out in large quantities.

And yet, while we stood along the edge of a seething volcano, we were trifling along through the Ordnance Department, trying to find a machine gun. With this war on, and America in it, we did not even adopt a machine gun until along in May sometime, and it was not finally adopted, I believe, until sometime in June. Then they adopted another gun—not the Lewis gun, that was being used on the battle front in Europe, but a gun that was still a gun on paper, and it is a gun on paper to-day—I do not care what anybody says about it—because it has never been given a field test. It has been developed, Mr. President, that all of these guns have to be experimented with and developed and changed and modified in one form or another before they can finally become an implement of warfare in the proper sense of the word.

It may be that the Browning gun, the one adopted, is the best gun. It is an automatic rifle. There are two classes of the Lewis gun, one light and one heavy. We are manufacturing the Lewis gun, and manufacturing it for aircraft. If they are good for that, why could we not have adopted the plans then in vogue, and have manufactured the Lewis gun, even if it was not the best gun, until final tests had discovered the best? They are the modern implements of war with heavy artillery, Mr. President, and without them America could not get anywhere. We are going to use them on the aircraft. The reply to the criticism of the tardiness in adopting a machine gun is: "Well, we have thirty or forty thousand of them for aircraft, the lighter kind." But, Mr. President, what I complain of is that they were not manufactured in large quantities in factories that were then manufacturing them for the British Government and for other countries.

I think the Secretary testified in regard to the contracts for the Browning gun. Contracts are out, and the guns are to be delivered some time at varying dates in the future. I ask you to read Gen. Crozier's testimony. I do not want to go into that. I do not think it would be proper to go into it; but we are advised that we have got some manufactured. The Secretary testified some time during the middle of January that we had nine guns at that time—nine Browning guns—nine guns to go up against the thousands of the machine guns of Germany. It may be that having nine shows that there is now an opportunity for quantity production, because the gauges may be ready; but we have been in the war 10 months, and nothing has been accomplished in the way of securing these guns.

I noticed in reading the proceedings of the British Parliament not long ago—and I think he was right—a member said, "You need not be afraid about giving Germany any information." Germany knows more about America to-day than many men connected with the department; and so far as I am concerned, my colleagues, I feel that America would be better off if her representatives would come out in the spot light and let the plain people of this land know what is being done, and then you could rely upon them to rally to the support of the President for the successful prosecution of this war. There is not any question about that.

Let us now consider the question of rifles.

We were furnishing Lee-Enfield rifles to the British Government in large numbers. The factories were prepared for them. It is true that Great Britain was trying to make an improvement upon the rifles used by her when she became involved in the war, but when the war came on Great Britain said we will not waste any time improving our rifles, but will get them out just as fast as we can, and they have been manufacturing them ever since. What did America do? With 700,000 rifles in America and in our colonial possessions, a motley group of different kinds of guns, America was seeking, through the Ordnance Department, to improve the rifle that Great Britain was manufacturing here and which we could have put out without any trouble in the factories. We went to work through the Ordnance Department to improve the Enfield rifle. I am frank to say it is a great improvement. I believe it is a better gun than the English gun, but here while the house was burning America was determining through its Ordnance Department what instrumentalities ought to be adopted to put out the fire. It took weeks and months before they finally got the Lee-Enfield rifle into condition where the Ordnance Department thought it was all right. And after this was agreed upon there were further delays caused by indecision. Here were the engineers of these great arms companies, who got together and finally agreed upon a program for the manufacture of these guns, and concluded that they would manufacture them with seven interchangeable parts, and they started to manufacture the gauges, the jigs, and dies, and everything necessary for the manufacture of guns with seven interchangeable parts. After the Ordnance Department had practically accepted the suggestion, it went to work through a distinguished ordnance officer and changed the plan from 7 to 40 interchangeable parts, and finally raised it to over 50 interchangeable parts, with the result that everything had to be stopped for awhile that additional gauges might be made. This may have resulted in improvement, but why the delay in the midst of the smoke of battle?

Mr. President, these things were only brought out by this investigation. You do not find them elsewhere. Why should not the American people be informed of them? Senators, there are a lot of people out in the wild and woolly West where I come from who, lying back in their cabins and in their homes, perfectly content that America has everything she wants, and they are not worrying themselves, and they are fathers of boys at the front. If they only knew, these mothers and these fathers, patriotic citizens of the West, the actual conditions, every one of them—every woman and man—would be up and doing and ready to give their lives and their all for the purpose of protecting America.

The casual reader of the Secretary's statement would conclude that we had everything in the way of ordnance and yet, take the testimony of men on the ground like Gen. Greble—we only called two or three—we did not want to take them away from their duties, and we find the conclusion would not be justified. Take Gen. Greble, commanding general at Camp Bowie. He testified that they have not a single trench mortar. They have not machine guns to any appreciable number, not

enough to train machine-gun men. The testimony of all is that the machine-gun man is not worth anything unless he has had some practice with a machine gun. They have not any howitzers; they have not any of the larger caliber guns. Senators, that is true of Camp Bowie, and it is true of nearly every cantonment and regular division in the United States. I am not saying it by way of complaining, Mr. President, but I am trying to show, and I want the American people to realize, that as to military program and policy America has none and that her military establishment as recently constituted has fallen down. If it had not been for the civilian people of this country, if it had not been for the men who have come here and given their time and their services, we would not have been anywhere.

I have in what I have said only briefly touched upon the Ordnance Department. Now I come to the Quartermaster's Department. You would conclude from the statements that are printed in the press of the country, that "everything is lovely and the goose hangs high," so far as clothing was concerned, but get on the ground and talk with men who are in command of these boys and you will find the conclusion is wrong; that is all there is about it. On a per capita basis it may be. My friend from Utah [Mr. Smoot] and I on a per capita basis may be worth \$100,000. He may have the \$100,000, but per capita I am worth just as much as he is, and yet I do not have anything. On the same test of a per capita basis America may have uniforms, but when you come to the proper distribution of uniforms they have not had them and they have not got them yet.

I realize the great difficulties that have confronted the Quartermaster General. I am not complaining of him as an individual. He has done the best he could under a faulty system, and the President is not responsible for the system. He inherited the system. He has done the best he could. But we are without the clothing just the same.

Now, I am going to show by Mr. Baker's testimony that he did not know it, and that is the reason why I am saying that the President, the premier of all the great statesmen of the world, if you please, recognized as the leader of thought in this great international cataclysm, and I say amen to it, did not know the truth, and I did. I had it from the lips of living witnesses. He must have gotten his facts from his distinguished Secretary of War and he in turn got them from somebody else, and if those who furnished the evidence knew the facts, they did not tell the whole truth. If the Secretary represented conditions to the President on their statement he could not have given the President the whole truth, for he did not know it.

My statement is challenged, my integrity is in question. I am going to pass around to the Senate some of the pictures taken in one of these cantonments, of young men drilling in the cold, in the snow, and working in the trenches and using wooden guns and other ordnance that they manufactured in the camps. That is all right; I am not complaining of it, but I am showing the facts. If I had a boy going to France to join a machine-gun company or an artillery company, I would want him to have had some practice with something else than a wooden cannon

or a telephone pole used for a cannon before he went over. I want Senators to see these pictures. I do this, Mr. President, because I feel it a duty that I owe first to my country and second to my conscience, and no man and no set of men on God's green footstool can keep me from telling the truth and carrying out the dictates of my own conscience. I have no fear of God, man, or devil. My only fear, my colleagues, was that in this discussion in some way or other it might have a psychologically bad effect upon my country and its cause, and yet I do not see how it can do otherwise than help. If these conditions exist, they ought to be corrected and corrected quickly. Great Britain found the same conditions and she corrected them pretty quickly as a result of fearless criticism. France found the same conditions and corrected them. America can not get her Army to manufacture these things. I do not care what they say, the graduates of military institutions stand at the top of their classes it may be, but when it comes to a young man trained along a particular line of duty undertaking to handle great commercial and manufacturing enterprises it is not in him to do it. You must go to the men who have done these things in order to secure results. Great Britain did that and France did it, and why should we not take this matter up and if Congress feels that there are inefficiencies it ought to correct them, though the heavens fall. Congress ought to do it without any fear of anybody, giving due weight and consideration always to the distinguished Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Now, what has been the result? I want you to read the Secretary's statement printed in the hearings about having substantially all these things in the way of equipment. While he was on the stand a few days ago, reiterating again the statement that our soldier boys were equipped, I said to him, in substance, as I took my seat at the head of the table with my distinguished colleagues, "Why, Mr. Secretary, I have just talked within the last five minutes with a commanding officer at one of these cantonments, and he tells me that he is short 7,000 coats." In his usual placid way he said, substantially, "That is not true." I said, "He just came from there and is it not true?" He turned around to the Assistant Secretary of War, and said to him, "Telegraph to the Quartermaster General and get his report." On the next day, the 14th of January, I got this letter from the Secretary:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 14, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR CHAMBERLAIN: On Saturday morning one of the members of the committee said that he had just talked with the commanding officer of Camp Sherman, and that there were, as I recall it, 3,000 men there without uniforms. You will recall that I asked the Assistant Secretary to direct at once that a telegram be sent to the camp to find out the facts.

I inclose a telegram which came on Saturday, the same day upon which the statement was made, and which states that the 31,024 men now at Camp Sherman were at that time all in uniform, and that a previous shortage of approximately 7,000 coats was at that time provided for.

I send this information because, as you will recall, I ventured at the time the statement was made quite definitely to express a disbelief in its accuracy.

I will say this for the Secretary, when he did not know he was very positive.

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This telegram I think should be called to the attention of the members of the committee, as it is of the highest importance to have them know both that this provision has been made and that the information upon which I have been relying in my testimony to the committee is not inaccurate.

Cordially, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senate.

The telegram is as follows. It came from the quartermaster addressed to Gen. Goethals.

CAMP SHERMAN, OHIO, January 12, 1918.

GOETHALS.

Quartermaster General of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Retel date, 31,024 men now at this camp all in uniform. Previous shortage of approximately 7,000 coats provided for.

CASE,
Camp Quartermaster.

That convinced me that the Secretary of War knew what he was talking about, and I was glad to have it confirmed, because there were some things I thought he was misinformed about. On the very next day, January 15, he sent me this letter:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 15, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR CHAMBERLAIN: I send you a telegram which has just been received from Camp Sherman. The information in it differs from that contained in the earlier telegram, which I sent you yesterday and which arrived on Saturday. Apparently the information given to you by Gen. Glenn as to the blouses was accurate. This telegram, however, shows that an adequate supply is in shipment, though not received by the time the telegram was sent.

Cordially, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senate.

That is the way it has been ever since the war commenced. It is on the way, but does not get there. Now, what does the telegram say?

CAMP SHERMAN, OHIO, January 15, 1918.

GOETHALS, PER HARDEMAN,

Office Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C.:

Thirty-one thousand one hundred and four men now in camp. All have overcoats and woolen breeches. Twenty-four thousand two hundred and four have complete uniforms. Sixty-nine hundred not yet supplied with coats, supply of which is now in shipment.

CASE,
Camp Quartermaster.

So the distinguished Gen. Glenn, commanding at Camp Sherman, a man whom I have always found willing to tell the truth, was nearly right. He comes from North Carolina, as whispered to me by the Senator from that State [Mr. OVERMAN]. God bless him; I wish we had more like him. Speaking from memory only, he missed it by 100, and I think I shall show by Mr. Baker's own testimony that when he made the statement that all these places were equipped he was mistaken. But that is not all I am going to show you. With all these statements, time and again iterated and reiterated, that our boys are substantially provided for, this committee asked The Adjutant General of the Army—this was a little after the 1st of January—to wire the cantonment and other commanding officers to furnish us with information as to the actual conditions in the cantonments and the conditions as to equipment C. Equipment C is the clothing out-

fit of a private soldier. In due course that information came to us. In the face of this statement that had been repeatedly made, that that equipment was all furnished or was substantially furnished, made upon the part of the Secretary of War and probably by the Quartermaster General, too, on the 12th of January the Secretary sends up to the committee the following:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 12, 1918.

Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,
United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: Pursuant to telephonic request of your committee to The Adjutant General of the Army that a report be obtained showing in percentages the shortages of articles of equipment (Quartermaster supplies at the different divisional camps as of January 1, or as near that date as possible, a telegram was sent all division commanders, and I now have the honor to submit to your committee, attached herewith, a tabulated sheet showing the state of equipment as disclosed by these replies.

Figures represent shortages in percentages. Where blank spaces exist, no shortages were reported.

Very respectfully

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

That information comes to us through the Secretary of War himself, contradicting over his own signature and in his own letter his previous statement that the equipment was all there.

I am not going to take time to read the statement of shortages, but I am going to ask that it may go into the Record because I want people to see. I want them to see whether or not I am distorting the truth when I say that the Military Establishment of America has fallen down. I propose to relieve myself of responsibility if the worst ever comes, so that I may go home to my family and to my friends and to my constituents and say, "I tried to invite the attention of the country to it, but they listened rather to those higher in authority, and my voice was as of one calling in the wilderness."

This statement contains the list of articles that go to make up the equipment and it shows the shortages. I ask that it may be printed in the Record.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection it is so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

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	Rays, burracks.	Clothing.	Belts, waist.	Breeches, cotton, O. D.	Breeches, woolen, O. D.	Coats, denim.	Coats, cotton, O. D.	Coats, woolen, O. D.	Curtis, h. vt.	Drawers, cotton.	Drawers, woolen.	Gloves horsehide.	Gloves, riding.	Gloves, woolen, O. D.	Hats, service.	Hats, denim.	Laces, legging.	Laces, shoe.	Leggins.	Ornaments.	Shirts, flannel, O. D.	Shoes, marching.	Shoes, field.	Stockings, cotton.	Stockings, fl. W.	Stockings, fl. W.	Under-shirts, cotton.	Slickers.	Overcoats.	Ponchos.	Trimmers, denim.	Shelter halves.	Brassards, red.	Brassards, blue.	Waistcoats and gaiters.	Cheerons.	Leggings, mounted.	Bars, mus. auto.	Bed sticks.	Cots.	Blankets.				
Third Regular Division	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
Fourth Regular Division	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Sixth Regular Division	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS.																																													
Twenty-seventh, Camp Wadsworth, S. C.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Twenty-eighth, Camp Hancock, Ga.	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
Twenty-ninth, Camp McClellan, Ala.	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
Thirtieth, Camp Sevier, S. C.	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
Thirty-first, Camp Wheeler, (a. Tex.	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Thirty-second, Camp MacArthur, Tex.	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Thirty-third, Camp Logan, Tex.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
Thirty-fourth, Camp Cody, N. Mex.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
Thirty-fifth, Camp Doniphan, Okla.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
Thirty-sixth, Camp Bowie, Tex.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
Thirty-seventh, Camp Sheridan, Ala.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
Thirty-eighth, Camp Shelby, Miss.	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	
Thirty-ninth, Camp Beauregard, La.	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	
Fortieth, Camp Kearney, Cal.	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	

NATIONAL ARMY DIVISIONS.

Seventy-sixth, Camp Devens, Mass.....	17	40	50	17	58	56	48	19	21	58	11	..
Seventy-seventh, Camp Upton, N. Y.....	..	25	2	..	96	5	..	10	19
Seventy-eighth, Camp Dix, N. J.....	19	16
Seventy-ninth, Camp Meade, Md.....	..	52	100	..	4	..	6
Eightieth, Camp Lee, Va.....	30	50	100	46	21	50	..	100
Eighty-first, Camp Jackson, S. C.....	7	9	73	30	..	100	..	7	5	50
Eighty-second, Camp Gordon, Ga.....	17	25	10	8	..	10	18	26
Eighty-third, Camp Sherman, Ohio.....	99	100	..	59	38
Eighty-fourth, Camp Taylor, Ky.....	55	23	100	70	50	70
Eighty-fifth, Camp Gustafson, Minn.....	25	10	98	..	100	25
Eighty-sixth, Camp Grant, Ill.....	5	75	100
Eighty-seventh, Camp Pike, Ark.....	..	20	5	24	..	23	12	10	21	23	23	..
Eighty-eighth, Camp Dodge, Iowa.....	3	6	100	..	19	1
Eighty-ninth, Camp Funston, Kans.....
Ninetieth, Camp Travis, Tex.....	50	17	50	100	15	7	30
Ninety-first, Camp Lewis, Wash.....	..	57
Ninety-second, Camp Funston, Kans.....	20	30	43	2	99	1	..	3	1	28
10	4	23	20	8	..	25	11	100

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me take one item for instance. I will take one of the important items—woolen coats—olive-drab woolen coats. In the Third Regular Division it is 10 per cent short; in the Fourth Regular Division, 54 per cent short; in the Sixth Regular Division, 90 per cent short—woolen coats—while we are in the midst of winter, and this is about the 1st of January. Take Camp Wadsworth, S. C., 18 per cent short. Take the Thirtieth at Camp Sevier, S. C., and there is a shortage of 60 per cent of woolen coats.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Where was it that there was a shortage of 90 per cent?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. That was at a Regular Army division; I am not sure about where it is situated.

Take Camp Wheeler, Ga., and I am going to call attention to some of the things in connection with these shortages, Mr. President, unpleasant though it may be, in an effort to show the Senate and the country as to the hundreds and thousands of young men who are dying in all of these encampments, that it is due to the inefficiency of the War Department itself; at least that is my conclusion from the testimony. I am not an expert; I do not know; but I charge that I conclude from the testimony that that inefficiency is responsible for it. I am not going to make that statement on my own authority; I am going to read into the RECORD the reports of the Surgeon General. I am not making these statements, Mr. President, without having sat with the committee constantly, never missing a single minute, except a part of one afternoon when I was called to a department. I know what every witness stated. If I had time to go into details, I could open the eyes even of the Senate.

Take Camp Doniphan, in Oklahoma, where there was a 53 per cent shortage of woolen coats.

Mr. GALLINGER. What was the shortage at Camp Wheeler, I will ask the Senator?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. At Camp Wheeler the shortage was 39 per cent of woolen coats.

Camp MacArthur had a shortage of 21 per cent; Camp Logan, Tex., had a shortage of 50 per cent; Camp Cody, N. Mex., 50 per cent; Camp Doniphan, Okla., 53 per cent; Camp Bowie, Tex., 40 per cent; Camp Sheridan, Ala., 59 per cent; and so on down the list. I think the highest shortage in woolen coats was 78 per cent.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Did the Senator state the shortage of such coats at Camp Custer?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They are all here. The shortage at Camp Custer was 75 per cent.

Mr. President, I will not read the whole list of these shortages, but Senators may take each item, and it will be found that these camps are short all the way, as I say, from 1 per cent to 100 per cent. This information comes right from the men on the ground. They know what they are talking about; they do not have to make their estimates on a per capita basis. They make their estimates on the ground, just as Gen. Glenn did when I asked him what the conditions were.

Mr. President, right in this connection I feel it my duty to the country to let them know, and I am going to call attention to

the reports of Gen. Gorgas himself, that nearly all of the deaths and the epidemics at the cantonments could have been avoided if the War Department had been efficient and effective.

In addition to the testimony of Gen. Gorgas, we have the testimony of men on the ground. We had Gen. Greble come up here. He is a splendid soldier. Whenever you get a soldier who has not any other ambition than an ambition to serve his country, you will invariably get the truth. It is not always so with one of these swivel-chair artists who wants to go higher, and from whom you can not ascertain what the truth is.

Gen. Greble came up here at our request; he is one of the men we took away from his post. Gen. Greble is stationed at Camp Bowie. I want you to read his testimony, because he shows the shortage in everything. In September last Gen. Greble began to see what was coming to his body of fine young fellows, and he began to reach out to try to get the things that were necessary to protect them from disease and to try to have those things done that would save them if disease came. He did not appeal to one man only; he did not appeal through the regular channels only; but he appealed through all channels. They had this body of splendid young men in tents, 12 in a tent, packed together like sardines, when they ought not to have had at any time more than five or six, or, at the outside, not over eight. Gen. Greble telegraphed to the Quartermaster General and stated in substance, "If you do not give us more space for these soldiers we shall have measles and pneumonia and other diseases in camp." He also appealed to Gen. Gorgas, and kept on appealing: Then he was sent to Europe on a mission. When he came back he found the same conditions practically existing. Not until some time in December did he get that for which he asked. Then the epidemic had broken out. As many as 8,000 young men went through the base hospitals and hospitals down there at Camp Bowie. Think of that!

Mr. TOWNSEND. How many?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Eight thousand.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. And how many deaths were there?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will give that to the Senator in a minute; I shall be glad to do so.

So, here was an old officer, who was accustomed to handle soldiers and who knew what was going to happen, as any sensible man knew what would happen. The Surgeon General has always advised the War Department that there ought to be 50 square feet of floor space to every man, and in those little tents they had placed 12 men. He did not get his request complied with until the worst had happened, until 8,000 men had passed through the hospitals and many of them had died; and absolutely had died without proper nursing because of the inefficiencies of the same system!

I challenge the Senators to read this testimony; do not take my word for it. You may single out a few witnesses who testify in opposition to what I am now stating, but when you get down to the men who know from actual contact and experience you get the truth as it appears on the ground.

If there is one man in America who knows what he is talking about when he talks about disease and epidemics, and knows how

to handle them, it is Gen. Gorgas. He has not only achieved a national reputation, but he has achieved a world-wide reputation for his splendid work at Panama, and he has made that formerly pestilential region a garden spot in which to live because of the efforts of himself and of his subordinates.

I am going to ask that all these reports of Gen. Gorgas be printed in the Record. All of these cantonments are radiating centers from which there goes out to the American people everything that is taking place there; and I hope that every young man will write to his mother and his father and tell of the conditions, not in order to stay the patriotism of America but to stimulate those in authority to do their duty to protect their lives, if they are to fight the battles of the country.

Secretary Baker says in his printed statement that—

The deaths in our forces in the United States from September to the end of December average 7.5 per thousand a year, slightly less than would have been the death rate of men of the same age at home.

Well, maybe that is true, but Gen. Gorgas says that amongst all the troops there has been a death rate of 8.2 per cent covering a little longer time. It is probable that Secretary Baker's statement is correct for the time he gives, and that Gen. Gorgas's data are correct for the time he covers; but what does a little thing like 2 per thousand of a million and a half men amount to? It does not mean anything, of course; let them die; it is only 2 per thousand; they have saved the balance of them. However, if proper precautions upon the part of the Government, if an efficient system had saved one young man who was risking his life for America, the American people would have been glad to have seen the money expended to save that one life. Particularly is that true in the light of the reports of the Surgeon General of the Army, which show that this condition was due to the fact that in most cases the troops were overcrowded and in some improperly clothed.

But that is not all. With that distinguished man at the head of the medical service of the Army and an able corps of assistants here, he was not even advised with as to the selection of the cantonment sites. Mind you, the men who go to these camps are selected men.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. How many cantonments are there?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. There are 30. Now, think of that! The man at the head of the medical department here in Washington, with a reputation in his line second to none amongst the professional men in the world, not even consulted with reference to the selection of these sites.

It may be said that, with the officer of the line who selected these camp sites, there went a young doctor. Whether he was from the Medical Corps, or whether he was some post or contract surgeon, does not make any difference to me; what I am getting at is that Surg. Gen. Gorgas was not consulted, and all this time he has insisted morning, noon, and night, in season and out of season, that in order to safeguard the health of these young men there must be at least 50 square feet of floor space to the man; and yet I venture to state, Mr. President, that there is not a single cantonment in the United States that has been built with that idea in view for protecting the young men.

But it may be said that these young men had to be called out quickly. What was the use of calling them out until the cautions were ready or at least hospital facilities? They might have been drafted into the service, and might have been assigned for duty at home or allowed to remain somewhere where they would not have been compelled to give up their lives because of a lack of care.

I will take these camps at random, and, inasmuch as I have referred to Camp Bowie, I will call attention to that. I will say to my southern friends and colleagues that the same conditions prevail down there, as you will know if you will take the trouble to go on the ground. First, I will take Camp Sevier, S. C., as a random case. Here is Gen. Gorgas's report:

Sanitary conditions here are serious. Sixty men have died of pneumonia in the past month. The camp has been exposed to a general epidemic of measles, about 2,000 cases having occurred within the last month. During this same period, they have had 175 cases of pneumonia and 15 cases of meningitis. The new conscripts of this command are men who are nonimmune to measles. They come from the neighboring Southern States where population is scarce, and, therefore, have not had measles in childhood. Always, with measles, a certain number of cases of pneumonia occur. The mortality of pneumonia from any cause is always high.

Now, note:

2. The basic unsanitary condition, however, in my opinion, is overcrowding. In the past, in this camp, the division commander has had to put 11 and 12 men in a tent, due to the shortage of tentage. This would give about 20 square feet of space to each man. At present, he has to put nine men in a tent, which gives about 28 square feet to the man. I urge that the division commander be directed to furnish at least 50 square feet of floor space to the man, which would give about five men to the tent.

Now, note another item. I am not going to read the whole report, but I will say these statements are given in the face of the inference to be drawn from the statement of the distinguished Secretary of War that everything is all right in these camps.

5. There has been a good deal of discomfort and exposure on account of the men having nothing but their summer clothing.

Mark you, this report was made on the 29th of November—

This has been in great part corrected in the last 10 days by the arrival of woolen clothing and overcoats. The O. D. (olive drab) wool has not yet been issued, but the authorities are informed that it is on the way. The whole command is still in khaki.

That statement is along the line of many other statements where it is shown that the men not only do not have olive drab woolen clothing but that they are still in their summer clothing, the Secretary of War to the contrary notwithstanding, because we have this testimony, or some of it, from men on the ground and from such distinguished men as Surg. Gen. Gorgas.

I will now take as another illustration Camp Bowie—

Mr. TOWNSEND. Where is Camp Bowie?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. At Fort Worth, Tex. Now, note, I quote again from Gen. Gorgas:

We have had in this camp during the past month 41 deaths from pneumonia, with 409 cases admitted. About 2,900 cases of measles in the same length of time. The causes of this condition are much the same as in the other camps reported upon. The great number of cases of measles is due to the fact.

The general then states about the same reason as given in the reports from which I have already quoted, as to men coming

from sparsely settled States, who have not had measles in childhood. I will not read that, but the general goes on to say in his report:

1. I recommend that the division commander be directed to furnish sufficient accommodations so that each man will be allowed 50 feet of floor space. This would give not more than five men to a tent.

2. Measles and other epidemic diseases are introduced into these camps by cases being brought by the incoming troops. To provide against this an observation camp should be established, where all newcomers could be kept under observation for at least 14 days, and no new men should be placed in general camp until it is free from infection. I recommend that the division commander be directed to establish such observation camp, and that no fresh men be sent in until he is ready to receive them under the above instructions.

3. The command, until recently, has had nothing but their summer clothing.

That report was made on the third day of December last.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Have no observation camps been established?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. None at all that I know of; the men go right into the camps; that is the system. Let me say that all these things could not be done at once; it has been a herculean task for the War Department to do these things, but they could have kept these men back—there is not any question about that—until the hospitals were built as well as the cantonments; they could have established observation camps; that would have been a very easy matter. Now note:

The command, until recently, has had nothing but their summer clothing. This has caused a great deal of discomfort and probably increased the tendency to pneumonia. Most of the command has recently been issued woolen underclothing, and I am informed that the thick clothing for the whole command is now in camp, with the exception of overcoats—

With the exception of overcoats—
and are in process of being issued.

They have been "in process," Mr. President, since this war began.

I urge expediting the forwarding of overcoats as rapidly as possible.

The base hospital is in an unfinished condition; no water in the hospital, no plumbing, or sewer connection. With the large number of patients in this institution this lack of water, plumbing, and sewer connection causes serious inconvenience to the sick, and increases greatly the burden of caring for them.

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. President, I will ask the Senator what is the date of that report?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. That report is dated December 3. They come down even later, however, and there is practically no difference in these reports.

I am going to ask that these reports be inserted in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair hears no objection.

The matter referred to is as follows:

NOVEMBER 26, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General, United States Army.

To: The Chief of Staff (through The Adjutant General of the Army).

Subject: Report of inspection of Camp Wheeler, Macon, Ga.

1. In my recent inspection of Camp Wheeler, at Macon, Ga., I found conditions as had been indicated by reports. There had been a sharp epidemic of measles, some 3,000 cases, and as always occurs with measles, a certain number of cases of pneumonia. At the time of my visit, there were some 300 cases of pneumonia in the

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hospital. While the hospital was crowded, the right of way was given the pneumonia case and they were being well cared for.

2. In the past month there have been about 60 deaths from pneumonia. The height of the measles epidemic was passed some ten days ago and at the time of my visit the epidemic was markedly on the decline, but the pneumonia was still on the increase. Generally pneumonia does not develop in a patient until a week or ten days after the incidence of the measles.

3. We can, therefore, expect a considerable number of deaths from pneumonia.

4. The camp is well situated and was in generally good condition. I think the reason for the measles affecting so severely this particular camp is the fact that men came from the surrounding Southern States which are sparsely settled and therefore the inhabitants do not, as a rule, have measles in childhood.

5. A large proportion of the cases of pneumonia were evidently contact cases and I am anxious on this score, fearing that we may be beginning here an epidemic of septic pneumonia. We have had a few cases of meningitis, a few cases of scarlet fever and some cases of mumps.

6. Whatever the original cause of the epidemic and the present conditions, all these evils are accentuated by the crowded condition of the camp. The tendency to pneumonia has no doubt been increased by the fact that the men have generally been exposed to the cold weather of the past month with no other protection than their summer clothing. Clothing is now rapidly coming into camp and about two-thirds of the men are supplied with woolen garments.

7. I recommend that it be insisted upon that all men in the camp have 50 feet of floor space each, and to accomplish this such additional shelter be supplied as may be necessary; that no fresh men be brought into the camp until the epidemic has subsided; that an observation camp be established and that all new men be kept under observation until the main camp is free from infection.

W. C. GORGAS,
Surgeon General, United States Army.

CAMP SEVIER, GREENVILLE, S. C.,
November 29, 1917.

From: Surgeon General, United States Army.

To: Chief of Staff, United States Army.

Subject: Camp sanitation.

1. Sanitary conditions here are serious. Sixty men have died of pneumonia in the past month. The camp has been exposed to a general epidemic of measles, about 2,000 cases having occurred within the last month. During this same period they have had 175 cases of pneumonia and 15 cases of meningitis. The new conscripts of this command are men who are nonimmune to measles. They come from the neighboring southern States, where population is scarce, and therefore have not had measles in childhood. Always with measles a certain number of cases of pneumonia occur. The mortality of pneumonia from any cause is always high.

2. The basic insanitary condition, however, in my opinion, is overcrowding. In the past in this camp the division commander has had to put 11 and 12 men in a tent, due to the shortage of tentage. This would give about 20 square feet of space to each man. At present he has to put 9 men in a tent, which gives about 28 square feet to the man. I urge that the division commander be directed to furnish at least 50 square feet of floor space to the man, which would give about 5 men to the tent.

3. I also recommend that an observation camp be established where fresh men can be isolated and kept under observation for at least two weeks, or until the camp itself shows evidence of being free from infection.

4. The division commander tells me that he expects a large increase in the force at an early date. I urge that no fresh men be sent to this camp until the division commander says that he is able to care for them along the lines of this recommendation.

5. There has been a good deal of discomfort and exposure on account of the men having nothing but their summer clothing. This has been in great part corrected in the last 10 days by the arrival of woolen clothing and overcoats. The O. D. wool has not yet been issued, but the authorities are informed that it is on the way. The whole command is still in khaki.

6. Heat and plumbing are badly needed in the hospital. Both were authorized two weeks ago. I recommend that the matter be pressed

and the hospital be equipped in this respect at just as early a date as is possible. The hospital needs badly more transportation. I recommend that they be furnished one motor car, one 3-ton truck, one 1½-ton truck, and one ½-ton truck. The hospital at present has 750 patients.

W. C. GORGAS.

—
CAMP BEAUREGARD, LA., December 1, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General, United States Army.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington.
Subject: Sanitary conditions, Camp Beauregard, Iowa.

1. During the past month this camp has had 38 deaths from pneumonia and 6 from spinal meningitis. During the same length of time they have had 2,300 cases of measles, 177 cases of pneumonia, and 11 cases of spinal meningitis. The immediate cause of the pneumonia from which the mortality comes is the epidemic of measles. Both the measles and pneumonia are on the decline. The sanitary conditions, however, I consider very serious, and steps should be taken at once, as far as possible, to remedy them.

The command is at present quartered at the rate of nine men to a tent. This gives about 28 feet of floor space to the man, and, in my estimation, is excessive overcrowding.

I recommend that the division commander be directed to put up sufficient tentage to give each man at least 50 feet of floor space, which would furnish about 5 men to a tent.

2. The camp has become infected with measles and meningitis by the transfer of infected troops from other camps. To avoid continued infection in this way an observation camp should be erected where new arrivals could be kept under observation for at least two weeks, and for such longer period of time as necessary while the main camp shows evidence of infection. This same precaution should be taken with regard to men being transferred to other camps.

3. The base hospital is located 4 miles from town. I recommend that the hospital be furnished at once with one 2-ton truck, one 1½-ton truck, and one ½-ton truck, and one motor car, urgently needed for its transportation.

4. The base hospital is located about 2 miles from camp and connected with camp by a very poor road. The road is in such poor condition that the transfer of sick from camp to hospital is hard on the patients. I recommend that the road between the hospital and camp be at once macadamized.

5. The men in general came to this camp in their summer clothing, and have suffered a good deal of discomfort on account of cold. The tendency to pneumonia has been increased by their exposure to the cold in this badly clothed condition. Within the last two weeks the whole command has been furnished with winter underclothing. About half the men of the command have overcoats, but so far no olive-drab uniforms. The completion of the equipping of the command with winter clothing should be expedited as much as possible.

6. The division commander informs me that the placing of nine men to a tent was due to orders from Washington.

W. C. GORGAS.

—
Colonel, Medical Corps.

DECEMBER 1.

CHIEF OF STAFF,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

During the past month this camp has had 38 deaths from pneumonia and six deaths from spinal meningitis. During the same period 177 cases of pneumonia have been admitted to the hospital and 11 cases of spinal meningitis. An epidemic of measles exists, of which disease 2,300 cases have come on sick report during the past month. I consider sanitary conditions serious, though measles and pneumonia are now on the decline. The camp is much overcrowded, with nine men to the tent. I recommend that the division commander be directed to furnish not less than 50 square feet of floor space for each man, and that an observation section be established for the camp. I recommend that no more men be sent to this camp until the division commander is prepared to care for them along the lines of the above recommendations. Letter follows.

GORGAS.

MAJOR GENERAL.

CAMP BOWIE, FORT WORTH, TEX., December 3, 1917.

CHIEF OF STAFF, War Department, Washington:

Sanitary conditions here more serious than at other camps visited. In the last month 41 deaths from pneumonia with 409 admissions. Cause same as at other camps recently reported, primary causes overcrowding. Recommend that the division commander be directed to allow only five men to a tent and that no more men be sent to this camp until division commander says he is ready to receive them. Most urgent need in hospital of water, plumbing, and sewers. Urge this be ordered at once. Letter follows.

GORGAS.

CAMP BOWIE, FORT WORTH, TEX., December 3, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General of the Army.

To: The Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington.

Subject: Condition Thirty-sixth Division, Camp Bowie, Tex.

1. We have had in this camp during the past month 41 deaths from pneumonia, with 409 cases admitted. About 2,900 cases of measles in the same length of time. The causes of this condition are much the same as in the other camps reported upon. The great number of cases of measles is due to the fact that the men come from the sparsely settled States of Texas and Oklahoma and have not had measles in childhood, but the basic cause is due to the overcrowding of the camp. We have at present nine men to a tent. I recommend that the division commander be directed to furnish sufficient accommodations so that each man will be allowed fifty feet of floor space. This would give not more than five men to a tent.

2. Measles and other epidemic diseases are introduced into these camps by cases being brought by the incoming troops. To provide against this an observation camp should be established, where all newcomers could be kept under observation for at least fourteen days, and no new men should be placed in general camp until it is free from infection. I recommend that the division commander be directed to establish such observation camp, and that no fresh men be sent in until he is ready to receive them under the above instructions.

3. The command, until recently, has had nothing but their summer clothing. This has caused a great deal of discomfort, and probably increased the tendency to pneumonia. Most of the command has recently been issued woolen underclothing, and I am informed that the thick clothing for the whole command is now in camp, with the exception of overcoats, and are in process of being issued. I urge expediting the forwarding of overcoats as rapidly as possible.

4. The base hospital is in an unfinished condition; no water in the hospital, no plumbing or sewer connection. With the large number of patients in this institution this lack of water, plumbing and sewer connection causes serious inconvenience to the sick and increases greatly the burden of caring for them. I recommend that telegraphic instructions be sent to the division commander at once to put in plumbing, water and sewer connections. I also recommend that telegraphic instructions be sent to put in electric cookers in the diet kitchens in all of the wards.

5. I met by appointment last night the governor of Texas and the health officer of the State. They made several criticisms of conditions, which I thought were justified, but they were satisfied. I think, when I pointed out the impossibility of meeting in all respects the conditions that have been suddenly forced upon us, and that we were trying in every way to correct these conditions. A copy of the recommendations of Gov. Hobby, addressed to the division commander, was furnished me at our interview, which is inclosed herewith.

6. There is a great deal of uneasiness and criticism among the people with regard to conditions here, which are worse from a sanitary point of view than in any of the camps I have visited.

7. I think the recommendations I have made will tend to correct the existing sanitary errors, but I can not urge too strongly that they be put into effect at once. The camp site and surroundings are all that can be desired. The troops and general conditions are good, with the exception of such conditions as relate to the epidemic diseases at present prevailing.

MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. ARMY.

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THE BASE HOSPITAL,
Camp Pike, Ark., December 5, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General.
To: The Chief of Staff.

Subject: Report on conditions at Camp Pike, Ark.

1. During the last month we have had at this post 57 deaths from pneumonia, with 241 admissions; 4 deaths from spinal meningitis, with 16 admissions; 2,100 cases of measles admitted; 128 cases of scarlet fever, with 11 deaths—the immediate cause of death in these cases being pneumonia, they are included under that heading; 124 cases of mumps. These figures indicate a serious condition of affairs at this camp. The principal cause of measles, as has been pointed out in other camps, is that a large number of the troops came from the sparsely settled States and had not had measles before. The 16 cases of meningitis occurring within the month, 10 came from Fort Riley. This is an illustration of the way one camp can infect another by means of cases brought by incoming troops. All these infections have evidently been introduced into the camp by troops coming from other infected camps or by men who had been infected at their homes. An important means of preventing this for the future will be the building of observation camps, where the men can be kept under observation for at least two weeks before they are admitted to the general camp. As this camp shows such evidence of severe infection, I think the same observation camp could be established for those going out.

2. Crowding in this camp, I do not think exists to any appreciable extent. When the division shall have been filled, we will have about 40 square feet per man. As this camp shows such marked evidence of infection, I recommend that this be increased by means of additional buildings to 50 square feet per man.

3. The number of cases of measles admitted has been declining rapidly for the past 10 days, and I believe the present epidemic is over. The number of cases of pneumonia from measles, as would be expected, is on the increase and we should naturally expect a greater number of deaths from this disease during the next week or 10 days. Within the last 15 days 8,000 new men have been introduced into the camp. It is possible that when these 8,000 men begin to show infection, we will go through an epidemic similar to that through which we have just passed. However, as most of these men come from the thickly populated State of Iowa, I do not think it probable that they will have measles as severely as the men who have just been through the epidemic, but certainly until this matter is determined and the camp is free from infection, no additional men should be sent here. I recommend that the division commander be directed not to receive more men until he is able to comply with the recommendations above made concerning space and observation camps, and until this camp shows evidence of being free from infection.

4. One great difficulty here is lack of segregation. In Camp Bowie, for instance, if we get a case of meningitis in a tent of nine men it is a very easy matter to segregate these nine men and determine whether or no they have been infected. Here, with a squad room containing 120 men, this is much more difficult. I urge, therefore, that in extending this camp, as above recommended, that the quarters to be erected for this purpose and for the purpose of isolation contain not more than eight men.

5. The command has been in its summer clothing until recently. During the last month the winter clothing has begun to come in and the men are now pretty well supplied with thick clothing, though there are several commands in the camp that have not yet been fully supplied. This lack of clothing with the exposure to the cold has no doubt been an element causing large pneumonia rate.

6. The camp is well located and the camp site good. Cleanliness and order and general sanitary conditions, with the exception of the epidemics, seem to be excellent.

7. The hospital is nearly completed and is as well supplied as could be expected under the circumstances. At present they have in the hospital 1,251 patients. This somewhat crowds the hospital, as it was built for a thousand patients. The overflow is at present being cared for, and I think well cared for, by the use of the galleries. Additional nurses' quarters are needed, additional officers' quarters at the hospital, and additional barrack buildings for hospital attendants are needed. A

small kitchen in the rear of the wards for contagious diseases and some addition to the administration building are needed. The hospital is very short of transportation. I recommend that one touring car and one 3-ton truck and one 1½-ton truck be permanently assigned to this hospital.

—
SURGEON GENERAL.

CAMP FUNSTON, KANS., December 7, 1917.

Colonel, Medical Corps.

CHIEF OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.

Strongly recommend that sites for detention, quarantine, observation camps, as selected on this reservation by the commanding general, Camp Funston, be approved. Action now being delayed by post commander on technical grounds of local command. Urgent that action be taken at once.

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GORGAS.

CAMP FUNSTON, KANS., December 8, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General.

To: The Chief of Staff.

Subject: Sanitary report, Camp Funston.

1. During the past month, this command has had 84 deaths. Of these 84 deaths, 54 were from pneumonia, with 189 cases; 34 deaths from meningitis, with 70 cases; 131 cases mumps. This indicates a most serious condition of the cantonment, as far as infection from the two serious diseases, meningitis and pneumonia, are concerned. As emphasized in the draft situation, I call attention to the fact that they had 84 deaths from all causes, when the normal death rate of such a command should be about 12.

2. The reason for this condition, as we look back, is very evident. When the drafted troops were brought in, they came in large numbers, all at once. The cantonment was excessively crowded. Between October 4 and October 26, 36,000 drafted men were injected into the cantonment. Among these there were many meningitis carriers.

3. This part of the country is well known to all health officers as having been, for the last few years, the principal endemic center in its civil population for meningitis. Granting the conditions above mentioned, no further explanation is needed to explain the present conditions as to meningitis. I would attribute the form of pneumonia existing here principally to the past crowding of the cantonment. It is the same form that occasionally becomes epidemic when large numbers of men are brought together in a crowded space. The excessive dust, which blows about in blinding storms, has no doubt accentuated the condition, and as it occurred at the other cantonments, the lack of woolen clothing has also been a contributory cause. The cold weather in October, to which the men were exposed in summer clothing and without any heat in their barracks, tended in the same direction.

4. In discussing this matter, I will first treat it as if the conditions were new and nothing had been done, and will point out what should be done under such circumstances. As a matter of fact, the epidemic has been excellently handled, and all measures I have to recommend have been put into effect as far as possible for the division commander to do so.

5. Meningitis and other infectious diseases were originally introduced from the outside. To meet this condition, observation camps should be established, where all men coming into the camp could be observed for at least two weeks, or such longer period as may be considered necessary. In this way, the men who had been infected could be picked out as they developed those diseases, and the incoming troops finally gotten out in an uninfected condition. The same process should be observed with troops leaving the camp as long as the camp showed evidence of infection. Orders should at once be given that no more troops be sent to this cantonment until the division commander states that he is ready to receive them.

6. The internal arrangement, as regards the isolation and caring for infectious diseases, should conform with those measures that are generally recognized as applying to these conditions, and that are at present being carried out most satisfactorily and successfully in the camp. As a matter of fact, all the above recommendations are being carried out at present, as far as lies in the power of the division

commander. To cover the question of overcrowding, I recommend that at least fifty (50) square feet of floor space be allowed to every man.

7. I think, however, it would be wise for orders to be issued to Washington, directing that in the future the measures above recommended be carried out. My desire to have this done is with the object of giving the divisional commander the opportunity of asking for such material as he needs for putting up the observation camps he is at present constructing, and also with the idea that it may be an order that will govern all future commanders of this cantonment. I wish to particularly call attention to the telegram sent out regarding this matter, relative to ground for a detention camp in the post of Fort Riley. This is very much to be desired.

8. The camp has been located in the river bottom and is excessively dusty. In my experience, the use of oil on the roads and grounds has been very successful in lessening the dust. The division surgeon tells me that their experience here has shown that the use of oil for this purpose is very effective. I recommend that they be supplied with such amount of oil as they find necessary to meet this very unsanitary condition.

9. In their observation camp, as at present being erected here, they are using a tent, floored and framed with side walls, that holds five men each. I think this is an ideal condition. It gives complete segregation and no overcrowding. I recommend that as these tents wear out they be converted into permanent buildings by putting on a roof. I recommend that all future construction conform to the plan so wisely adopted in the observation camps, of allowing only five men to the building, which gives 50 square feet of floor space to the man, and segregates in bodies of five.

10. It is a very important element to get patients from various parts of the camp to the hospital promptly. For this purpose here the three motorized ambulance companies are used. Great difficulty is found in getting the motor ambulances started during the cold weather on account of the freezing of the water in the radiators. I recommend to obviate this the ambulance sheds be inclosed and heated.

MAJOR GENERAL. U. S. ARMY.

DECEMBER 27, 1917.

From: The Surgeon General.

To: The Chief of Staff.

Subject: Sanitary conditions at Camp Doniphan, Okla.

1. During the past month Camp Doniphan has had 74 admissions from pneumonia with 11 deaths, 316 cases of measles with 1 death, 104 admissions from diphtheria with 1 death, and 6 cases of meningitis with 4 deaths. While the number of cases and the number of deaths from the above-mentioned diseases are somewhat less than in other camps visited, the conditions in respect of those diseases is considered serious. The basic cause I consider to be overcrowding of the camp. At present there are nine men quartered in each tent, which gives a totally inadequate floor space for each man. I recommend that the division commander be directed to furnish sufficient tentage or other accommodations so that each man will be allowed 50 feet of floor space. This would give no more than five men to a tent.

2. Measles and meningitis were introduced into these camps by cases being brought by incoming troops. To provide against this in the future, it is recommended that an observation camp be established for all newcomers where they may be kept under observation for at least 14 days, or as much longer as may be considered necessary by the division surgeon, and no new men from observation camps should be placed in the general camp until it is free from infection. I recommend that the division commander be directed to establish such observation camp and that no fresh men be sent in until he is ready to receive them under the above instructions.

3. To properly control the spread of measles, meningitis, and pneumonia now confronting Camp Doniphan, it is necessary that tent contacts be immediately removed from the general camp upon the appearance of the first case of communicable diseases and placed in a separate detention camp for daily observation and treatment during the incubation period of the disease. It is recommended that such a detention camp be established for such contacts in addition to the observation camp previously recommended for incoming men.

4. The command until recently has had nothing but summer clothing. A great deal of discomfort has resulted and undoubtedly the tendency

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to pneumonia has been increased. I am informed that shipments are now coming in rapidly and that as fast as received are being issued to the men. From personal observation, however, I find that many men are still wearing their cotton khaki clothing.

5. The base hospital is in an unfinished condition. Many wards which are required for patients are not yet finished, and this has caused great embarrassment to the hospital authorities. The installation of a sewerage system and necessary plumbing in all buildings was authorized several weeks ago, and while work has been begun, it is now at a standstill, and the difficulties in caring for patients is greatly increased thereby. It is urgently recommended that the work of installation of sewers and plumbing be expedited.

W. C. GORGAS,
Surgeon General, United States Army.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. In order to get this thing before the Senate in a concrete form, I asked Gen. Gorgas to make me a detailed statement of the annual death rate per thousand from all causes. It is very short, and I will read it.

DEATH RATES ALL CAUSES.

Troops in United States September 21, 1917, to January 18, 1918.
Annual rate per 1,000.

All troops.	Regulars.	National Guard.	National Army.
8.2	4.71	10.04	8.53

The history of this country will show that wherever there has been a record of it kept, the men in the Regular Army suffer less from disease than any other body of soldiers, because they have learned to take care of themselves. They have been in the service long enough to know how. These young fellows that come from civil life have not learned that, and that is one of the reasons why it is necessary to take them into these camps for training.

Number of deaths among Regular troops in United States, Sept. 21, 1917, to Jan. 18, 1918-----	350
Average strength of Regulars for same period-----	214,428
Number of deaths among National Army troops in United States, Sept. 21, 1917, to Jan. 18, 1918-----	1,263
Average strength of National Army for same period-----	427,088
Number of deaths among National Guard troops in United States, Sept. 21, 1917, to Jan. 18, 1918-----	1,305
Average strength of National Guard for same period-----	375,354
Number of deaths all troops in United States, Sept. 21, 1917, to Jan. 18, 1918-----	2,918
Average total strength for this period-----	1,016,870

That gives in concrete form the number of deaths that have occurred.

Mr. President, what I contend is that if the authorities had complied with the recommendation that Gen. Gorgas has made all the time, of giving each of these men 50 square feet of floor space, and if in addition to that they had put in these observation camps within the cantonments, the percentage of deaths would have been very much diminished, and I doubt if there would have been one-half of the deaths that there have been.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, will it disturb the Senator if I ask him a question?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will yield to the Senator this time, but I do hope I may be permitted to proceed without being further interrupted.

Mr. GALLINGER. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I am particularly interested in this phase of the discussion relating to

the health of our soldiers; and I will ask the Senator if he has inquired as to whether or not the recommendation of Gen. Gorgas that the floor space per soldier should be increased has been attended to, or whether any attempt has been made to remedy the evil?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They are attempting it in some places, but it has not been carried out. Right in this connection I want to suggest that there is no law requiring it to be done; I do not know whether any is necessary or not; but the Medical Department, which has been making an effort right along to save the lives of these young men, can not get the things that they want.

Mr. OWEN. Of course not. They have no standing.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They have not the standing with the line that they ought to have. Why, here we had four training schools for the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Medical Corps and for doctors of the Medical Corps, where they could go and be trained. Two of them were cut out, and two left, and the Surgeon General is trying now to get the two enlarged so that they can train these men.

Mr. President, I am going to illustrate by two or three cases that the neglect of these young men is shameful. I am not going into it fully. I get many letters, but I am going to take the liberty of reading one or two, because I want the country to know that I know what I am talking about. I do not want to shock the conscience of America. I want America to know some of the facts, and, if need be, have them know all of the facts, in order that the mothers and fathers of these lads may write to those in authority, to the President and to the Senators as well as to the Representatives, and appeal to them, in the name of humanity and in the name of America, to see to it that these boys who are offering up their lives on the altar of their country may be protected wherever it is humanly possible to do it.

St. Louis, Mo., December 31, 1917.

Mr. GEO. CHAMBERLAIN,

Chairman Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: In behalf of a heart-broken family (a father, mother, two sisters and myself) I wish to register a complaint for the manner in which the case of my brother ———, was handled at the base hospital, ———.

From the meager information my folks received, it appears that brother was stricken with a slight illness on Monday, December 10, and on Wednesday, the 12th, he was taken to base hospital at ——— with cerebro spinal meningitis, and on Tuesday, December 18, 10.20 a. m., he passed away.

First information my folks received was Friday, December 14. A neighbor lady received a letter from her son, a comrade of my brother, advising he had seen brother fall out of ranks at drill and was carried on a stretcher to hospital.

My sister wired an officer (a friend of our family) in Company ———, Infantry, at noon Friday, December 14, to spare no expense and to wire, collect, details. Saturday morning, December 15, received a reply from the officer to the effect brother sent to base hospital with spinal meningitis, but condition favorable for recovery.

Upon receipt of latter telegram, sister wired a doctor in Company ———, Infantry, to wire details collect and to spare no expense. Sister also on December 15, Saturday, wrote three special-delivery letters to the officer, doctor, and a comrade, respectively, for particulars, but received no more information until Tuesday evening, 6 o'clock, a wire from the company officer that brother passed away 10.20 a. m., December 18. This wire was sent from Fort ——— at 3.15 p. m., December 18.

It doesn't seem that the Company ——— officers should have been required to furnish information in this case and that they only did so as a matter of respect for a lifetime friend and an appreciative

family. Can it be possible that the Government hospital of this proud Nation of ours is not equipped to advise a father or mother of their son's misfortune in an authentic way, as not any of the information received came from the hospital direct? I notice daily in the papers that cablegrams are received clear across the ocean, advising condition of troops serving under our flag in France, but right at our doorstep our gallant soldiers might die and be buried without the knowledge of the father and mother, who supplied them, if it were not for the affection and thoughtfulness of their comrades.

My God, my colleagues and friends, if they are suffering here in America, with the blessings and comforts of home, surrounded by neighbors and friends, what must be the fate of these poor boys if they are sent abroad to meet the dangers and the treacherous and inhuman warfare and conditions that exist abroad?

For very palpable reasons I am not going to give the names of these people, but I want to show you that the letters breathe the spirit of patriotism. Having given up their sons to their country, they make no complaint, except in the hope that the example in their own family may set a precedent for better conditions and better service.

Now, note the spirit of patriotism that breathes through every line of this letter.

Brother's body was shipped with our instructions to his home, ———, Kans., for burial. I had the casket opened for identification purposes and was mortified beyond expression to find that, although brother died for his country, he was not placed in a uniform. He was not even clothed, being wrapped only in cotton and tied up in a sheet.

Also, discovered that a post-mortem had been held, which I understand is permissible only with consent of parents or relatives. The traces of embalming were very scarce and the features were gone entirely, making it impossible for a local undertaker to put the body in shape for my father and mother and sisters to view.

My brother is dead and in his grave and I can not expect to heal the wound in my broken heart by filing this complaint, but I am doing it all in a true American spirit and trust it will result in some good to those who may be so unfortunate as to lose their dear ones under similar circumstances. Would you be satisfied if this case applied to your brother?

Address all correspondence to me, as I do not care for my heart-broken father and mother to know all of the facts.

Mr. President, if I were to print in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD all the letters that I get along this line, it would shock not only Congress itself, but the American conscience as well. I put this in the RECORD, in order that the country may know that there is inefficiency; and, God help me, if I can assist in creating efficiency I am going to do it, if it costs me my political and my own life. Somebody, somewhere in this great Republic of ours, must look after these splendid young men who are doing their duty by and for their country. If I can be instrumental in saving one life, or in arousing my country to the necessity of trying to save thousands of lives, I shall feel that my life has not been illy spent. I, for one, believe in letting the sunlight in. Let but the American mothers and fathers realize that their sons might be better treated than they are, and while, like the parents of this young boy here, they will not ask for their discharge from the service, they will insist that the public servant whose duty it is to see to it will either do his duty or retire in disgrace from public life and public service.

I am tempted to read one more letter into the RECORD, Mr. President. I have tried to keep on an even keel in the discussion of this subject. I have great respect for the President, notwithstanding what he has done to injure me and my reputation

in this country; and in order that I may try to convince him and others that the charge of inefficiency is well founded I am going to put in the RECORD one more of the numerous letters that have come to Senators on the Military Affairs Committee. I just want you to see that what I said awhile ago about the Medical Department is absolutely true. They do not give them competent assistants; they do not assign to them men to be trained, with the result that a blacksmith, or a carpenter, or a lawyer, or anybody else goes into these base hospitals to take care of and nurse these young men.

It does not make any difference that my own party is in power. If any other party were in power, and I occupied this position, I would show the truth just the same. If these conditions can be corrected and these agencies of the Government made more efficient, the men of the Senate and the men of the House who neglect to do it are responsible to a higher tribunal, if you please, for the deaths of young men whose lives might have been saved if the proper authorities had but given this subject the attention that it is receiving at the hands of most of the members of the Military Affairs Committee at this time.

Why, my colleagues, this is not a new thing. Great Britain went through it. Pick up the paper this morning, and you will find the Secretary of the Admiralty, Dr. McNamara, being interrogated by a Member of Parliament to ascertain the truth with reference to the destruction of ships. They are keeping it away now from the British public as far as they can, but they are compelling them either to remain silent or tell the truth with reference to the destruction of human life by submarines. Let us turn the sunlight in on this thing, and we need never fear but that the American people will rally to the standard and follow President Wilson into the thick of the fray wherever their services may be needed.

I am going to read one more letter. I hope you do not think I am doing this for sensational purposes. I am doing it to illustrate a condition that exists, and a condition that can be remedied if they will only try to do it. There is not any reason why these things can not be remedied or have not been done.

One of the members of the committee hands me this letter. I might have gone over to my private files and gotten more of them; but this was handed to me, and I thought I would just call your attention to it.

DEAR SIR AND FRIEND: As you know, I have recently lost a son——

Mr. STONE. Who was that?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. One of the members of the Military Affairs Committee. I can show the Senator a great many more, addressed to me, if he wants them.

Mr. STONE. The Senator did not name the member.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, I have no objection to naming him. He is one of the most active and best-informed men on the committee, and he is a Republican, too. I refer to the Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH]. It does not make any difference to me in this fight what a man's politics are.

Having told the Senator's name, I do not know whether I ought to read the letter.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I have no objection.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The Senator has no objection? All right. I believe I said that I would not mention the name in connection with the letter, but it was delivered to me, at my request, because it accompanied other letters of the same character that were being read to show the horrors of this situation.

The Hon. _____,

DEAR SIR AND FRIEND. As you know I have recently lost a son with spinal meningitis at _____. I am writing to you as one that I know to be greatly interested in the welfare of our soldier boys, and ready to do anything in your power for their well being, and because you know me and will know whether to give credit to what I say.

Please know in the very beginning that I do not write to criticize the Government in any sense, nor to lay complaint against any one in authority. I realize that in the stupendous task before us as a Government, and with the great diversity of interests involved, that it is impossible that there should not occur some things that should be corrected. It is with the hope that I may help somewhat with the task before us that I lay bare the facts as I found them in connection with my son's sickness at _____.

Through friends entirely independent of the Army officers, and the medical staff, I learned of my son's sickness after he had been in the hospital for six days. With my wife I went immediately to the camp, arriving there the morning of _____. I found my son in the meningitis ward of the base hospital. It was the eighth day of his sickness, as I was informed by the attending physician. His mother and I and _____ were permitted to see him through a window at the head of his bed. The small room in which he was lying contained one other bed on which was a patient; a stove in which there appeared to be no fire. The room was not simply unsanitary, it was filthy, begging description. The bed on which my son was lying was even more filthy than the room. I can not describe to you the condition of my son's body. Except to say that neither his hands nor face had been washed in eight days. (The attendant admitted this to me.) The reason given for his being in this condition was that he, the attendant, had but one helper in the ward and there was 18 cases there at that time. I asked if I might put a nurse in there to take care of him and the physician said that could not be allowed. I offered to put in a trained nurse and pay all expenses.

I then asked if I myself might be allowed to go in and clean him up and take care of him. The physician, very kindly in manner all of the time, said that it could not be. I then asked if I would bring clean clothes for him if they would clean him up and put them on him so that his mother might see him again and not have to remember him in the plight she had just seen him. They said they would gladly do so. I went to _____ and got clean clothes, and when I returned they had made some effort to wash his face and hands, although they were still grimy and black. His clothes were changed, his bed straightened out, and his mother was called to see him again. There was no change made in the condition of the room. Before leaving I again made a plea to be permitted to care for him, gladly taking all risk, but the rules were inflexible, I could not be admitted in any way. The attending physician was kind to us and I do not wish to imply that he was in any way to blame. He told us, however, as we were about to leave that we should not return for three or four days. To this order I had no intention of giving heed, neither did I. His mother did not see him again. The next morning early his father-in-law _____, of _____, went to the ward, while the mercury was done about zero there was no fire in the room, the bedding was on the floor, the boy lay on the bed naked with the exception of a thin night shirt that was up around his neck.

About 3 o'clock that afternoon I found him in the same condition and the room without fire. The next morning at about 8 o'clock we found him in practically the same condition. No one knew of our visits to the hospital except two workmen, who were working on the sewer ditch in front of the hospital. To them I made myself known and the purpose of my going to the hospital. I refer now, of course, to the visits we made after we were instructed not to visit the hospital. On neither of these visits was there an attendant in the room or fire in the stove. A perfectly well man would have become sick in that room. The mercury was around zero all of the time.

At this time I went direct to the chief of the medical staff and told him the situation and asked to be permitted to go and attend my boy.

He immediately gave orders that I be admitted and be given every facility for caring for my son. I went at once, but I was too late, as he died about 15 minutes after I got into the ward and before I was permitted to do anything for him.

That you may know something of the fearful handicap that the Government works under in the matter of competent help, I give you this one instance

Now, I want you to note this:

I requested the attendant to give my son a drink of water. He went out and brought in a small bowl of water, and tried to get son to drink from it, but he could not. He said I guess that I had better get a funnel. (The boy was lying on his back with his mouth open.) He came back in a moment with a funnel made of a piece of newspaper, and, putting it in my son's mouth, was in the act of pouring the bowl of water into my son's throat when I stopped him. He said what shall I do? I said get a spoon. The poor fellow had not thought of that. My son died in a few moments.

I at once hastened to the office of the adjutant, and asked for the body, and was very courteously treated and assured that I could have the body that evening. I then hastened back to the ward where my son died to see how the body was prepared for burial, and, as I had my pass into the building, I did not stop and knock but opened the door to enter when it struck something that would not let it open further. I looked and saw that it was my son's body lying on the floor of the hall, and it was his head that I struck with the door.

I received every possible courtesy from the officers and medical attendants at the base hospital. I am not now filing any complaint against any man. I have no other purpose in giving you these facts than to get you to do your utmost to see that these boys of ours who are yet to die at these camps may have the care that every true man wishes that they might have. There are at least four witnesses to most all of the facts that I have written here who will be willing to testify to the truth of them if it would be the means of helping the authorities to bring about better conditions

I trust, _____, that you will believe me when I say that I am not in any sense seeking revenge for the death of my son. If in his dying he is the means of securing better attention for the many boys that are yet to suffer and die in these camps, I shall feel that his death was not in vain. Wishing for you success in your endeavors for humanity, I am,

Sincerely, your friend,

I read this because I want you to see the patriotic spirit in the hearts of this people, notwithstanding these things exist, which should be remedied.

Mr. TILLMAN. Who wrote that?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will show it to the Senator confidentially.

Mr. TILLMAN. It ought to be given to the country.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President. I want everyone to know that I am speaking from the record of things and not indulging in any camouflage when my country's fate is at stake. I have put these letters in the Record, horrible as they are, simply because I want to arouse the people of this country so that every mother and every father who has sent a son to this Army, whether as a volunteer or as a drafted man, will write to the President of the United States and to Members of Congress from their respective districts in the same patriotic spirit in which these two letters are written, when those sons have died of neglect, not for revenge, not to punish anybody connected with this great Military Establishment in this crisis that confronts us, but in order that the fate of a beloved son or brother or husband, if you please, may arouse the attention of the country to the necessities of the occasion and save the lives of young men who are valuable units for the salvation and protection of America.

Mr. President, I have talked longer than I intended. I could not in one day strike bottom with the evidence we have showing

inefficiency, and I am saying this without any unkind feeling toward Secretary Baker. When these measures come up for consideration, if the Senate wants to go into it more fully, the testimony will be printed, and I think if Senators want to act on their own judgment rather than because the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy wants a thing to be done, I can convince them these laws ought to be passed.

I realize that we ought not to cripple the hand of the President. There is not anybody who wants to do that, but no man's judgment is as good as the concrete judgment of America. I do not care who he may be and how great he may be, he can not know as much as the world knows. I know how busy the President is, and I want to help him. God knows I would do anything to help him, notwithstanding the opinion he has of me as expressed in his public statement, and I believe I can say without egotism that no man has tried harder to help him in everything that he has desired for the proper conduct of this war than I. I have not done it because it was his or any man's policy. I have done it because America was at war and these things appealed to me as being right, and because I thought the country needed them. I voted to sustain the coal order the other day, although I thought it was a foolish order made by Mr. Garfield. I voted for it on the theory that I wanted to help save the young lives of America and our allies in France. The evidence before the committee shows that at the time the order was made there were over 127 vessels in the harbor of New York loaded with supplies for the allies, and they could not get coal to send them out. That is the reason why I voted to sustain that order.

My friends, if there had been any program in this war; if there had been any plan laid out for the conduct of this war the coal situation never would have happened, and that is what I am complaining of. That is why our committee proposes in one of its bills to have a war cabinet that can map out a program or policy under the sole direction and authority of the President for six months, or any length of time, as any business man would do. In this great business establishment of ours, because war is a great business proposition now, why has not some plan been worked out, and I challenge the production of a plan or a program. There is not anybody connected with the establishment who has time to do it. The distinguished President of the United States could not do it if he tried, because he has more to do now than he can possibly attend to. The war cabinet of Great Britain do not do anything else than is indicated in the bill which the committee has prepared.

I think there was one thing in the statement I made in New York to the effect that the Military Establishment had almost ceased functioning. That is a pretty broad charge. I repeat the charge, and as evidence of it I call your attention to this fact: There was a Quartermaster General's Department that had \$800,000,000 to expend for supplies for the Government. It, practically under the instruction of the distinguished Secretary of War, turned the whole thing over to a distinguished retired merchant or manufacturer of worsted goods—I think his business was at Cleveland, Ohio—and the Quartermaster General's Department has simply been a rubber-stamp proposition since war was declared. If turning over the functions of this great office to a civilian merchant was not a cessation of

functioning on the part of the Government, what in Heaven's name would you call it? This agent made the contracts to be signed by the Quartermaster General, he prepared for the manufacture of the commodities, bought the goods, and presented them to the Quartermaster General for distribution, and that is all. I felt sorry for the Quartermaster General. Not only did they do that, but they took the soldiers' overcoats that were 100 per cent wool, even then lighter than the British and the French, and reduced the woollen content to 65 per cent wool and 35 per cent of shoddy or reworked wool, and then they got along so nicely with that they reduced the wool content of soldiers' overcoats to 50 per cent of wool and 50 per cent of shoddy or reworked goods.

Mr. THOMAS. What is the name of the man?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Eisenman. I have no criticism of Mr. Eisenman. No matter what people may say about him he has done or tried to do a patriotic work. He may be criticized about very many things, but I think he has done fairly well. What I am getting at just now is not what he has done, but the surrender of this function by the Quartermaster Department to an individual.

The answer to that was that it was to conserve wool. There may be a woollen shortage, but France has not found it necessary to conserve wool in that way. If anybody has got to wear shoddy it ought to be the civilian who stays at home, and we should give the soldier the best uniform it is possible to make in America. If there must be a shortage of provisions let the civilian who stays at home go short and hungry, but feed the soldier who is to carry the gun. That may be a wrong conception of duty, but that is the way it appeals to me.

Mr. President, I wish to give another indication of inefficiency, and I want you to understand I am not doing this in any spirit of unfriendliness to the Secretary of War. He has been my personal friend. I am only doing it because I feel it is my duty. As another evidence of inefficiency the woolgrowers of the West came here last April, I think, shortly after the war broke out, and offered to furnish the Government with the clip of that year. The Government did not take it because they thought the price charged was too high, and possibly the growers were charging a pretty good price. It was a little below or about the current market price, but the authorities would not take it. Later on they came here again and offered it and the authorities would not take it. Later on we made contracts for large quantities of wool, but wool had then gone up to a very high figure.

Now, Mr. President, anybody would have known, it seems to me, any efficient business man must have known, that to clothe a million and a half men or possibly two million men we would have to buy every pound of wool possible and manufacture it into clothing. Yet it went into the hands of speculators and dealers, and when the Government got ready to buy, it had to buy at a high price. I think all will agree with me that while there has been great work performed there has been much left undone that might have been done if efficient methods had been in vogue in the War Department.

Now, we have only investigated two great departments, but we are going to investigate others. Notwithstanding some may object to our making these investigations, we feel that it ought to be done. The President says in his statement—

Mr. VARDAMAN. May I ask the Senator a question?

The PRESIDENT *pro tempore*. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Mississippi?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I would very much rather not yield.

Mr. VARDAMAN. I merely wish to ask the Senator who fixes the weight of the textiles worn?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It has been determined in these cases by Mr. Eisenman in consultation with other members of the Council of National Defense, and the Quartermaster General, and other officers, but his judgment has generally been followed.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Is it lighter than it was?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It is not lighter, but the texture now used is not as warm as wool.

Mr. VARDAMAN. What was the purpose?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The conservation of wool. I would rather have more attention paid to the conservation of life, as is done in France and Great Britain.

A young British officer the other day appeared before our committee dressed in a splendid uniform, a good deal heavier in ounces than our uniforms.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Possibly the answer of the Senator to the question may be misunderstood. I hope he will make it clear that the uniforms for our soldiers are made of material which is 4 ounces per yard lighter than those worn by the British or French soldier.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. That is correct. I stated it in general terms, but I did not show the exact difference. I am glad the Senator gave it.

Now, Mr. President, let me call attention to what the President says in his public statement:

There have been delays and disappointments and partial miscarriages of plans, all of which have been drawn into the foreground and exaggerated by the investigations which have been in progress since the Congress assembled—investigations which drew indispensable officials of the department constantly away from their work and officers from their commands and contributed a great deal to such delay and confusion as had inevitably arisen. But, by comparison with what has been accomplished, these things, much as they were to be regretted, were insignificant, and no mistake has been made which has been repeated.

Nothing helpful or likely to speed or facilitate the war tasks of the Government has come out of such criticism and investigation. I understand that reorganizations by legislation are to be proposed—I have not been consulted about them and have learned of them only at second hand—but their proposal came after effective measures of reorganization had been thoughtfully and maturely perfected, and inasmuch as these measures have been the result of experience, they are much more likely than any others to be effective, if the Congress will but remove the few statutory obstacles of rigid departmental organization which stand in their way.

Now, with all due respect for the President of the United States, he serves notice on Congress that they had no business meddling with this affair either by investigation or legislation. If the Senate of the United States feels it to be its duty to go into an investigation, it must not do so unless its course meets the smile of Executive favor. Now, I differ radically and essentially from that view. We are a great coordinate part of this Government; and I am going to take the liberty of calling the attention of my Democratic friends to a Democrat of days gone by, a leader who dared to protest against Executive interference with congressional action. When I become a rubber stamp in the discharge of my duty I shall get out of the Senate and out of public life and let some one more subservient take my

place. You will remember, Senators, that there was on one occasion another Democrat in the Senate, who was appointed the leader of his party, when there was a Democrat in the White House. You remember when the famous Wilson bill was up for consideration it did not meet with Executive favor as it passed this body, and the President wrote a pretty stiff letter while the bill was in conference between the two bodies upbraiding Congress for what it had done.

That letter was read into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Mr. Wilson, who was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House, and although he had been in conference according to the RECORD with his comembers, the first time any of them saw it was when it was printed in the RECORD or possibly printed in a paper. Now, here is what Senator Arthur Pue Gorman, of Maryland, said about that letter. I have not indulged in any such hostile criticism as this, both because I have too much respect for the great office he holds, and further because I am in perfect sympathy with all the President wants to do in prosecuting this war. I want to help him. There is no anger in my heart and no malice. I want my friends to distinctly understand that. I would go to the White House at any hour of the day or night to help the President win this war and discuss any proposition that might come up, no matter what he thinks of me. I place my country above all other considerations.

Here is what Mr. Gorman said on the occasion referred to:

As I have said, sir, this is a most extraordinary proceeding for a Democrat, elected to the highest place in the Government, and fellow Democrat in another high place, where they have the right to speak and legislate generally, to join with the commune in traducing the Senate of the United States, to blacken the characters of Senators who are as honorable as they are, who are as patriotic as they ever can be, who have done as much to serve their party as the men who are now the beneficiaries of your labor and mine, to taunt and jeer at us before the country as the advocates of trusts and as guilty of dishonor and perfidy.

Mr. President, it is time to speak. The limit of endurance has been reached. The Senate owes it to itself. Every Senator here who is a part of this Democratic majority owes it to himself. There is no power, no matter how great, in this country, even the President with his patronage, that would keep me silent longer under the charges, under the imputations so freely made from such distinguished quarters. I hurl back the accusation—

Says Senator Gorman—

and say that this treatment of their fellows is discreditable. It is destructive to the Government that men in high position should attempt to lower this body, a conservative body, consisting, when full, of 88 worthy representatives of States.

No man can reach here by devious ways and remain long. The Senate is composed of men who represent the best thought of the country, men who have stood and battled for tariff reform when those in higher places dared not show their heads; men who, when another place was overrun and those in it had not the courage to stand and fight a tyrant, stood here at the risk of health, at the risk of fortune, of all that is dear, and saved the liberties of the country. Then these traducers of the Senate could not be seen. We will not be traduced longer, Mr. President, the facts must come.

I glory in the spirit that was shown by Senator Gorman. I occupy a little different position. This charge by our distinguished President has not been hurled at the Senate; it is hurled at my devoted head. I am only one of 96; I am only a unit in this body; but above and over it all is a great principle that the Senate, Democrats and Republicans, and the country at large ought to stand for. It may be me to-day; it may be the Senate to-morrow, or any or some individual Mem-

ber; it may come in five years when somebody else is in the Senate; it does not make any difference who that person may be; I insist upon the principle, not because I have been assailed; that this body as a coordinate branch of the Government has a right to speak as it pleases as to conditions. The Senate can investigate any man or any set of men that it sees fit to investigate, and do it at its own sweet will without suggestion and without let or hindrance. If the Senate will only assert that right once, then we will not be troubled with this condition very often in the future. The Senate ought to assert its dignity and its part and parcel in this great governmental machine.

Now, let us go back a little longer and see what other great men in this country thought about Executive interference with legislative business, because, with all due respect to the President, that is what the statement quoted means, that we are interfering by these investigations and hindering the proper conduct of the war.

Here is what Senator Blackburn read into the RECORD while this discussion was on, and, by the way, let me say that two distinguished Senators from the South, Senator Vest, of Missouri, and Senator Jones, of Arkansas, took the same position. God bless them! May sweet memories of them long linger around these sacred halls and may their spirits animate the Senate in the discharge of its duty during the whole conduct of this war.

Senator Blackburn read this into the RECORD from an old foggy of the days gone by, but he had some part to play and played it gallantly in the early days of the Republic. Mr. Blackburn read this from Washington's Farewell Address:

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it, which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position.

The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of the other, has been evinced by experiments, ancient and modern—some of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way in which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.

Senators, I am not resenting the intimation contained in the President's statement about these investigations, constituting an interference with the prosecution of the war, but I am simply calling the attention of the Senate to the condition that may confront them at almost any time. However, is it entirely true that this investigation has done no good? Why, Mr. President, there has been an attempted reorganization of the military system since we started into it. Of course, it is claimed that the reorganization was commenced before we got busy. For instance, with all due deference to my good friend, Gen. Sharpe, who is a splendid man and a patriotic citizen, he was wholly unfitted for that job, and he has gone out of it, and they have

put Gen. Goethals in. That is a part of the reorganization. With all due deference to my friend, Gen. Crozier, who has been a gallant soldier and a brilliant man, I think that in these days that move so fast, perhaps, he was not quite the man for the place, and he was practically taken out of the active control of the Ordnance Department, and Gen. Wheeler was put in.

What else have they done? They have put Mr. Eisenman just where he was with the old régime but under Gen. Goethals. They have put into the Ordnance Department another distinguished gentleman, Mr. Samuel McRoberts, who is a very able man, and I think will possibly help bring order out of chaos.

Mr. TILLMAN. Will the Senator answer an inquiry?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. I want to know what the Military Affairs Committee was doing while all this mismanagement was going on?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. In time of peace?

Mr. TILLMAN. Oh, no. The War Department has been reorganized.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. We are trying now, I will say to the Senator from South Carolina, to help out things. I do not want to mention any names, but I could mention the names of distinguished Members of the Senate and House who have always stood in opposition to a reorganization that was a reorganization in fact, and they are doing it now.

Mr. TILLMAN. I have never opposed a reorganization in the War Department, but I do oppose any reorganization of the Navy Department.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Well, we have not proposed any such reorganization. If the Senator will only take the trouble to read the bill which we have here, he will find that it does not take an iota of power away from the President. It gives him more. There is no effort being made to create a single organization that the President could not control.

But, getting back to the point I was making, I desire to say that this investigation has done good; it has removed some inefficient, and is bringing about some changes in a defective organization. But the Secretary still retains the Council of National Defense and its subcommittees as a purchasing or some sort of an agency between the President and the Army. It has no power, but is simply an advisory body. It can not nor can its committees enforce its orders.

Mr. OWEN. With no statutory power?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. With absolutely none. The Council of National Defense is simply an advisory body, that is all; it has no executive power. Those are the boards that are to take charge of and handle this new organization.

I say, instead of having this voluntary organization between the President and the Army, they ought to have one strong man between the President and the Army completely under the President's direction and control to handle this whole situation, and to utilize whatever organizations are now or may be created by order of the President. I merely call your attention to the fact that we have done some good.

Senators, the President says that we have not consulted him about this legislation. I am very sorry the President said that.

Now, speaking as a Democrat, and not as an American for a few moments—[laughter in the galleries]—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair wishes to admonish the occupants of the galleries that any signs of approval or disapproval will result in a clearing of the galleries. This is positive, and will be done.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HITCHCOCK] and I, while these hearings were going on, went to the White House and told the President the way things had been developing before the committee and that we thought he ought to know it. We went into it pretty fully. We stayed there an hour. I think the President was surprised at some of the things we told him; in fact, he expressed surprise. The remedy was the thing that was in our minds. I said that the proposition for a director of munitions had been under consideration by me for a long while; that I had been studying the British system, and that something like that as a strong intermediary between the President and the Army ought to be a remedy for the situation. The conversation was not confidential, as I understood. We were simply talking about conditions. I would not even refer to it but for the fact that it is charged as to our committee—a splendid body of men—that none of them had discussed this legislation with the President. The President did not approve or disapprove, but he had the information just the same.

Several days afterwards—I do not know how long—the President wrote a letter to me in reference to that bill. I would not give that letter to the public but for the fact that I am charged by the President with a distortion of the truth. Now, I am compelled, in defense of my own reputation, as well as in order that the position of this committee may be understood, to put the letter in the RECORD, and I am going to do so. The letter is as follows:

(Personal.)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 11, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR: When you and Senator HITCHCOCK were at the White House the other evening we were discussing various suggestions of coordination and means of speeding up the military programme and among other things you told me that you had in mind a bill for the creation of a munitions ministry.

That, of course, set my mind to work on that particular suggestion, and I feel that I ought to say to you, now that the matter is clear in my mind, that I hope sincerely no such recoordination will be attempted. For one thing, it would naturally include the Navy as well as the Army and would, so far as the Navy is concerned, bring about, I fear, a dislocation of activities which would cause delay where there is none that is avoidable; and in regard to the Army, I think that nothing substantial would be accomplished. Indeed, I believe that delay would inevitably be produced by such a measure.

I have had in the last few months a great deal of experience in trying to coordinate things, and upon every fresh coordination delay inevitably results and not only delay, but all sorts of cross currents of demoralization which are very serious impediments to the effective conduct of business.

Rather intimate information from the other side of the water convinces me that the munitions ministries which have been set up there have not fulfilled the expectations of those who advocated them, and the structure of those governments is so utterly different from our own that we could not, if we would, create any such parity of power and influence between the head of such a bureau and the heads of the permanent departments as can be created under such political arrangements as the French and English.

In short, my dear Senator, my judgment is decidedly that we would not only be disappointed in the results, but that to attempt such a thing would greatly embarrass the processes of coordination and of

action upon which I have spent a great deal of thought and pains, and which I believe are more and more rapidly yielding us the results we desire.

I felt that I ought not to keep you in ignorance of what had been going on in my mind with regard to this important matter.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senate.

Was it quite fair for him to charge that he had not been consulted?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield.

Mr. JAMES. Is it not true that the President when he stated that he had not been consulted referred to the "superior war cabinet" bill and not to the "munitions ministry" bill?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. That may be so; I think it is susceptible of that construction.

Mr. JAMES. I will say to the Senator that, hearing on yesterday that he was construing the letter of the President, which referred merely to the proposed munitions ministry bill, as a reference to the "superior war cabinet" and therefore that he intended to urge that position as rather questioning the President's statement, I called up the White House and told the President of my information. He sent me a letter which I am sure the Senator will not have the slightest objection to being read by the Secretary.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will be glad to have it go into the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Secretary will read.

The Secretary read as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 23, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR: You have been kind enough to tell me that you had heard that I had written a letter to the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee concerning the idea of a munitions minister, and you asked me whether I did write such a letter. I did, and am glad to send you herewith a copy of it.

The consultation referred to with Senator CHAMBERLAIN, to whom the letter is addressed, was upon the subject of the various difficulties and delays that had been encountered by the War Department, as shown by the testimony before the Senate committee, and the Senator merely mentioned to me that he had a bill in mind to create a munitions ministry. He gave me no detail of the bill he had in mind, and it was only when I learned afterwards from others of the real character of the proposals that I felt it my duty to write to the Senator and appraise him of my attitude. I assumed from what I heard later that that particular proposal had been abandoned, and I was referring in my statement of the other day to the very surprising proposal to create a superior war cabinet of a type unknown to our practice or institutions.

I give you these details merely to reply to your kind inquiry and let you know all the facts of the case as you desire.

Cordially and sincerely, yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

Hon. OLLIE M. JAMES,
United States Senate.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am very glad, indeed, to have that go into the RECORD. The letter practically states the facts. The letter to me states them just as clearly, because it mentions the same proposal for the creation of a director of munitions.

Mr. JAMES. But it is true, I believe the Senator in perfect fairness to the President would like to say, that the President's

statement that he was not consulted about the "superior war cabinet" bill was true. He was not consulted about that, was he?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Well, that is subject to some qualifications. Without questioning the statement of the President, let me tell you what happened. The Military Affairs Committee on Friday appointed the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HITCHCOCK] as a committee of one to go down and confer with the Secretary of War, which he did. Whether the President was informed about it or not, I do not know.

Mr. JAMES. Is it quite fair, does the Senator think, to charge the President with having information that was given by a Senator to a member of his Cabinet? Probably the Cabinet had not met and the matter had never been discussed.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I did not intend to be understood as questioning the veracity of the President in any way; I am only stating what did happen.

Mr. JAMES. I feel sure the Senator did not; but I believe that, upon second thought, the Senator will realize when he reads the letter the President directed to him, together with the letter directed to me, they make it perfectly clear that the President is absolutely right in his statement that he was not consulted.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I really should like to go on.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The President said that he had information about the war-cabinet bill, but that he got it secondhand.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let us not be misunderstood about it. Here is the President's language in his published statement:

I understand that reorganizations by legislation are to be proposed. I have not been consulted about them and have learned of them only at secondhand.

I do not know whether that is broad enough to include the munitions bill or not; but that is the language used. I am just stating my version of it. It goes to the country just the same that I was trying to "put over" something on the President without letting him know anything about it; that is all. I do not want that impression to go out. I am not questioning the veracity of the President, even if mine has been questioned.

There is much that I might say, but only one thing I want to say in conclusion. The President in his statement says that:

To add, as Senator CHAMBERLAIN did, that there is inefficiency in every department and bureau of the Government is to show such ignorance of actual conditions as to make it impossible to attach any importance to his statement.

As I undertook to show the President in my letter, I was referring to the Military Establishment only in my impeachment, and my audience understood that I was referring to the Military Establishment. I did not want it understood that I impeached the efficiency of every department of the Government. The statement was really a little broader in that regard than I would have made it if I had sat down and had written the speech. I would have confined it to the War Department. It was a sweeping statement, impulsively and impetuously made, and intended by me to include only the Military Establishment. I think I tried to explain that it was too sweeping, and now in this public manner I state that I did not intend to impeach the

efficiency of all the departments of the Government. I was in no position to do that. I had not investigated as to all, but I intended to impeach, and I do impeach, the efficiency of the Military Establishment, and I think I have shown enough to sustain my charge of inefficiency.

Now, it is said we have not done any good. Let me tell you that that very statement of inefficiency has done some good, not only as regards the War Department, as stated by me a while ago, but it has speeded up at least one other department. My good friend Secretary Redfield, very courteously inclosed me this letter. I will not have it read but I will put it in the RECORD, to show that my statement induced the Secretary to appeal to his whole office force to try to speed up and do better, so that the charge of inefficiency might not rest on them. I admire the spirit in which Secretary Redfield took my suggestion. It was a suggestion made to help and not to hurt. I ask that Secretary Redfield's letter be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. In the absence of objection, it is so ordered.

The letter referred to is as follows:

"THRIVE BY THRIFT, BUY WAR SAVINGS STAMPS"

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, January 23, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR: The letter of which the inclosed is a copy has been handed each member of the department's force in Washington and placed by publication before its force throughout the country.

Yours, very truly,

WILLIAM C. REDFIELD,
Secretary.

HON. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, January 21, 1918.

To the officers and workers in the Department of Commerce:

United States Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, is reported through the press to have said on the 19th instant, in an address before the National Security League:

"The military establishment of America has fallen down * * * it has almost stopped functioning * * * because of inefficiency IN EVERY BUREAU and IN EVERY DEPARTMENT of the Government of the United States."

The emphasis is mine.

We in this department form no part of the military establishment, though in every branch we are in full cooperation with it. We are included, however, under the charge that inefficiency "in EVERY bureau" and "in EVERY department" has led to the result said to exist. If it exists it is said to be at least in part our fault. All departments, all bureaus, are sentenced together. Such a statement from such a source must (if we may assume it to be correctly reported), be given weight. It is either true or false as regards ourselves. What lesson can we learn from it?

Candidly I had not believed any such sweeping condemnation could be justly made of our mutual service. The words of cordial praise that comes often unsolicited from many sides about every one of our services, the commendation of the business and industrial world, the noble spirit of self-sacrifice so freely shown by you in many forms, the known and definite results of our common efforts, the constant touch with all our work that you know it is my pleasure and privilege to try to maintain, these and what I had permitted myself to think 30 years of industrial and executive experience had taught me had led to the belief that in this department, so far as the law and the funds at our disposal permit, we have on the whole a highly effective organization even when judged by severe standards of industrial practice. Nor, let me say in justice to

you, am I aware that any external inquiry into the work of the department has been made upon which to base a charge to the contrary effect. We are, as you know, constantly studying our work in all its forms with a view to its improvement.

But this is beside the mark. Our work, if good, will speak for itself. We have neither duty nor right of self-praise. What I ask you, every one of you, to consider for yourself is whether this charge is true of you, of your division or bureau, of your part, whatever it be, in our common work. For now more than ever must we do our work well. The slacker in work, if such there be, plays Germany's game. Inefficiency is a sin against your country. Red tape, unless required by law, is an offense against patriotism. Let us speak plainly. If inefficiency exists it must cease or the ineffective ones must go. This is no hour for hesitancy about persons.

But having thus in all seriousness said, let me add in conclusion that I fully believe the firm confidence I hold in you is for sufficient cause and will be more than justified by the high effectiveness of your service.

Yours, very truly,

WILLIAM C. REDFIELD,
Secretary.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. God knows I have tried my very best to do things here to help speed the work of preparation for this war, not as a Democrat, but because my heart was in it and because I believe it was right to do so. I have frequently done things in opposition to members of my own party and in opposition to many distinguished men on the Republican side, but together we have tried to improve the Military Establishment.

The last suggestion of the President in his charge against me is:

I am bound to infer that that statement sprang out of opposition to the administration's whole policy rather than out of any serious intention to reform its practice.

Et tu, Brute! That is "the unkindest cut of all." My colleagues, I have stood here in season and out of season to get through nearly every piece of military legislation that has been put on the statute books in the past three years and that my friend Baker now boasts of and that the President is proud of, with what success I leave to the Senate and to the country to judge. I have taken charge of other measures here. I do not claim any credit for that; I give my colleagues equal credit for these things; but I happened to represent the committees on the floor, and I worked most assiduously all the time. I will say this, however, that I have not stood for any measure because it was any man's measure; I have stood for it because it was for America, to assist her in this crisis that now confronts her. That is why I have done it.

I am not opposed to the President's policies. I was born in a country where Democrats were indigenous to the soil. I took my politics west with me 42 years ago, to a State which was Republican when I first went there and has been ever since. I have been a Democrat all the time, and I am a Democrat now; but I have some convictions about these matters and other public questions. When I have supported all these measures I have done it because I thought they were right and not because I got orders from anywhere.

I have differed from the President on a number of occasions, and I have not hesitated to do so. I differed from the President when the Panama tolls question was under consideration: I differed very radically from him and did all in the world I could to keep the measure for the repeal of the Panama free-tolls act of 1912, advocated by him, off the statute books not only because it was contrary to our platform of 1912 but



because I did not consider it right. I have differed with our distinguished Executive on a number of nominations which he has sent here; but nearly all of the policies he advocates are Democratic, and nearly all the policies that he has proposed I have stood for. I think you will find that in very few instances have I separated from Democratic colleagues; and when I have done so it has been because I felt I was right. I will say that frequently I have followed my colleagues and followed the President on matters of policy when I thought they were all wrong; but I did it just the same. However, whenever it comes to a question where a principle is involved and my conscience is enlisted, I follow no man; I follow my conscience. I am doing that to-day, my colleagues, when I am undertaking to call the attention of the country to the dangers that confront America.

In God's name, are we going to get over to France? Within 10 months after the war broke out Canada had her gallant sons in the trenches assisting in some of the most desperate battles of the war. With her sparse settlements, with her lack of wealth as compared to that of the United States, she got her brave boys—and they are practically Americans, my friends—over there; but America can not get there. Where is the trouble? Mr. President, if we do not get there, and get there quickly, it may be too late to go, and, as my good friend the Senator from Iowa [Mr. KENYON] said here the other day, it would be better for a man to lose his life and to see his family die than to see the Teuton invade America.

You Senators know that there are soldiers along the Atlantic seaboard who ought to have gone to France six weeks or two months ago. They do not go. Why is it? At Mineola there were a lot of Oregon and other brave boys who went from a southern encampment to that bleak and barren place, and where some of them were kept for over a month in extremely cold weather, not sufficiently clad, and without the comforts that camp life ought to have furnished them, waiting to get over. There must be something wrong somewhere.

If America is going to play any part in this war, she will have to get at it pretty soon. France is expecting us and the other allies are expecting us, and it seems to me, Mr. President, that the only way to speed up our preparations, the only way to get "over there," is to arouse America to the necessity of the time and the danger of the crisis. When once aroused I have no fear but that America will rise in her might and furnish an example of sacrifice, of courage, and of patriotism that will make the brightest pages of our history pale into insignificance as compared with the fighting of our boys on foreign soil.

Mr. President and Senators, I apologize for having taken up so much of your time. You can realize that my reputation is all I have, and the love that my family and my friends have for me at home. With that reputation destroyed and that love gone, life would have no attraction for me; with my reputation assailed, with my country in danger, I know that you will excuse me for having trespassed so long on your time and patience; and believe me when I tell you that there is no man here to-day and there is no man in America who would go to the relief of President Wilson more quickly than I in our country's crisis, although I feel I have been so grossly maligned by him. I thank the Senate.

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